在“当管理人员在财务报告中使用判断和修改交易结构来改变财务报告，向某些利益相关者描述虚假的公司经济表现，或依靠会计报表中的数字来影响合同的结果”（Healy，Wahlen，1999，第368页）。

迄今为止大量的研究已经表明，管理人员行使酌情权并且通过各种方式进行盈余管理，从而在权责发生制下进行特别交易（即所谓真实的盈余管理）。进行盈余管理的主要诱因包括一些债务契约、奖金计划和平稳收入。债务契约假说认为，管理层进行盈余管理的动机是为了避免违反债务合同的约定，这是在会计数字或比例方面很典型的说法。奖金计划假说认为，管理层进行盈余管理是为了最大限度的获取收益。Healy（1985）认为，如果管理层的收入高于或低于奖金计划的范围，他们往往会降低企业收益。相反，当他们的收入在两者之间，谈们往往会增加企业收入。最后，收入平滑假说认为，企业追求利润以减少盈余波动。

盈余管理实证研究的发现支持了在各种环境中的上述动机。许多研究验证了预提费用与盈余管理激励机制之间的关系。（例如，Healy，1985；DeAngelo，1986；Jones，1991；Dechow等，1995）。作为替代方法，其他的研究集中于单一的项目，这表明具体的预提费用与系统的盈余管理激励机制有关。对后者的研究，McNichols和Wilson（1998）认为公司管理其坏账准备是根据奖金计划假说的。Zucca和Campbell（1992）通过审查可供出售的资产减值现象，表明企业使用这些预提费用是为了加强战略或盈余平稳。Francis，Hanna和Vincent（1996）认为盈余管理激励机制在解释商誉注销和重组费用中发挥重要作用。其他的研究集中在递延税款津贴（例如，Miller和Skinner，1998；Vincent和Wong，2003），它们提供了各自不同的结果。最后，Dowdell和Press（2004）分析了研发支出减值的过程，但他们没有找到证据支持他们的奖励计划假设。

关于盈余管理和具体的预提费用的结论，与上述研究是一致的。这项研究的目的，是测试当存在灵活性时，研发费用资本化还是费用化是否受盈余管理动机的影响。

4 理论假设

以下研究探讨的是盈余管理的三种主要诱因：盈余平稳、债务契约和奖励计划。在这项研究中，我们侧重于前两个，因为在意大利公司现存数据中，有关奖励计划的信息披露是有限的。

平稳收入假说认为，管理人员的会计自由裁量权，是由他们的欲望驱使减少收入来源导致的（Fudenberg and Tirole，1995）。平稳收入的过程是把中期到期末之间的收入波动从高峰转入到不太成功的时期，降低了高峰期收益，使收益波动较小（Copeland，1968）。

平稳收入一直被看作是一个积极的策略，它促使管理者向投资者传递内部信息（例如，Gordon，1964；Beidleman，1973；Romen和Sadan，1981；Tucker和Zarowin，2006）并通过投机目的来推动实践操作（Gordon，1964；Imhoff，1977；Kamin和Ronen，1978）。在这项研究中，我们不打算对这两种观点中的任何一种进行讨论。因为，我们测试的目的是研究研发费用资本化是否用于平稳收入。

Capitalization of R&D Costs and Earnings Management：Evidence from Italian isted Companies

ABSTRACT: The capitalization of research and development R&D costs is a controversial accounting issue because of the contention that such capitalization is motivated by incentives to manipulate earnings. Based on a sample of Italian listed companies, this study examines whether companies' decisions to capitalize R&D costs are affected by earnings-management motivations. Italy provides a natural context for testing our hypothesized relationships because Italian GAAP allows for the capitalization of R&D costs. Using a Tobit regression model to test our hypotheses, we show that companies tend to use cost capitalization for earnings-smoothing purposes. The hypothesis that firms capitalize R&D costs to reduce the risk of violating debt covenants is not supported.

KEY WORDS: Earnings management, Cost capitalization, R&D accounting, Earnings smoothing, Debt covenants, Italian companies

1 Introduction

In the current era of globalization, a highly relevant issue facing regulators, academics, and practitioners is the determination of an appropriate accounting treatment for research and development R&D costs. International Accounting Standards discuss accounting for R&D costs in IAS No. 38 “Intangible Assets” IASB, 2004;?IASB, 2004 . Paragraph 54 of this standard states that no intangible asset arising from

research or from the research phase of an internal project shall be recognized as an asset; and that research expenses shall be expensed in the income statement when they are incurred. Concerning development costs, paragraph 57 states that an intangible asset arising from development or from the development phase of an internal project shall be recognized if, and only if, an entity can demonstrate all of the following: a the technical feasibility of completing the intangible asset so that it will be available for use or sale; b its intention to complete the intangible asset and use or sell it; c its ability to use or sell the intangible asset; d how the intangible asset will generate probable future economic benefits; e the availability of adequate technical, financial, and other resources to complete the development and to use or sell the intangible asset; f its ability to measure reliably the expenditure attributable to the intangible asset during its development. Although IAS 38 allows companies to capitalize development costs, the inherent subjectivity of the validation process permits management to exercise discretion in deciding whether the conditions of IAS 38 have been satisfied. In essence, IAS 38 gives management considerable flexibility regarding the treatment of development costs.

US GAAP takes a stricter approach to the issue. SFAS No. 2―Accounting for Research and Development Costs FASB, 1974 ―requires that all R&D expenditures be expensed in the current period. The only exception to the