George Steomer¼°Æä·­Òë²ûÊÍÔË×÷ ÏÂÔØ±¾ÎÄ

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more or less severely, also in the common run and process of language acquisition and translation (the two being intimately connected). ¡°This means nothing¡± asserts the exasperated child in front of his Latin reader or the beginner at Berlitz. The sensation comes very close to being tactile, as of a blank, sloping surface which gives no purchase. Social incentive, the officious evidence of precedent¡ª¡°others have managed to translate this bit before you¡±¡ªkeeps one at the task. But the donation of trust remains ontologically spontaneous and anticipates proof, often by a long, arduous gap (there are texts, says Walter Benjamin, which will be translated only ¡°after us¡±). As he sets out, the translator must gamble on the coherence, on the symbolic plentitude of the world. Concomitantly he leaves himself vulnerable, though only in extremity and at the theoretical edge, to two dialectically related, mutually

determined metaphysical risks. He may find that ¡°anything¡± or ¡°almost anything¡± can mean ¡°everything¡±. This is the vertigo of self-sustaining metaphoric or analogic enchainment experienced by medieval exegetists. Or he may find that there is ¡°nothing there¡± which can be divorced from its formal autonomy, that every meaning worth expressing is monadic and will not enter into any alternative mould. There is Kabbalistic speculation, to which I will return, about a day on which words will shake off ¡°the burden of having to mean¡± and will be only themselves, blank and replete as stone.

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After trust comes aggression. The second move of the translator is incursive and extractive. The relevant analysis is that of Heidegger when he focuses our attention on understanding as an act, on the access, inherently appropriative and therefore violent, of Erkenntnis to Dasein. Da-sein, the ¡°thing there¡±, ¡°the thing that is because it is there¡±, only comes into authentic being when it is comprehended, i.e. translated. [Paul] Ricaur, ¡°Existence et hermeneutique¡± in Le Confit des interpretations (Paris, 1969).] The postulate that all cognition is aggressive, that every proposition is an inroad on the world, is, of course, Hegelian. It is Heidegger¡¯s contribution to have shown that understanding, recognition, interpretation are a compacted, unavoidable mode of attack. We can modulate Heidegger¡¯s insistence that understanding is not a matter of method but of primary being, that ¡°being consists in the understanding of other being¡± into the

more na?ve, limited axiom that each act of comprehension must appropriate another entity (we translate into). Comprehension, as its etymology shows, ¡°comprehends¡± not only cognitively but by encirclement and ingestion. In the event of interlingual translation this manoeuvre of comprehension is explicitly invasive and exhaustive. Saint Jerome uses his famous image of meaning brought home captive by the translator. We ¡°break¡± a code: decipherment is dissective, leaving the shell smashed and the vital layers stripped. Every schoolchild, but also the eminent translator, will note the shift in substantive presence which follows on a protracted or difficult exercise in translation: the text in the other language has become almost materially thinner, the light seems to pass unhindered through its loosened fibres. For a spell the density of hostile or seductive ¡°otherness¡± is dissipated. Ortega y Gasset speaks of the sadness of the translator after failure. There is also a sadness after success, the Augustinian tristitia which follows on the cognates acts of erotic and of intellectual possession.

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