of translation to compensate the loss of meaning and the violent transport (ibid.:316).
²ûÊÍÔË×÷µÄµÚÈý¸öÐÐΪÊÇÔÎÄÒâÒåºÍÐÎʽµÄÓ°Ïì¡£¡°×ÔÈ»»¯ÄÜ´ïµ½ºÎÖ̶ֳȣ¬Ò²¾ÍÊÇÎüÊÕÒýÈëµÄÐÐΪ¶ÔÕû¸ö±¾ÍÁÌåϵ½á¹¹¾ßÓиÉÈźÍÖØÖõĿÉÄÜÐÔ¡£¡±Ë¹Ì¹ÄÉ·ÖÎöµÀ£¬ÔÚÈںϵĹý³ÌÖУ¬Ä¿µÄÓïºÍÎı¾¶¼ÓÐËù±äÐΣ¬´Ó¶øΪÁËƽºâÕâÖÖ¹Øϵ£¬±£³Ö·ÒëµÄµÀµÂ£¬ÃÖ²¹ÒâÒåµÄÁ÷ʧºÍ±©Á¦µÄǨÒÆ£¬¾Í±ØÐëÒª½øÐл¥²¹Ðж¯¡£
In regard to the explication on the hermeneutic motion in translation, the following points are derived: understanding is the search for meaningful ideas, which is subjective and destructive. Thus understanding is at the risk of comprehensive appropriation, and therefore results in subsequent compensation. After Babel is a theoretical monograph on translation while presenting the author¡¯s reflections on language and culture. The author¡¯s profound learning on language, poetics, literary criticism, and cultural history all serve for his interpretation of translational behavior. He points that language exists permanently in a dynamic change as interpretation and translation continue for human communication. He presents ¡°penetrative insight into the act of translation, into the phenomeno-logical and philosophic aspect of this act¡±¡
(Steiner 1975: Preface to the second edition ).ÔÚ½âÊÍ·ÒëµÄ²ûÊÍÐÔÔË×÷¹ý³ÌÖÐÑÜÉúÁËÈçϵĹ۵㣺Àí½â¾ÍÊÇÑ°ÇóÓÐÒâÒåµÄ˼Ï룬ÕâÖÖÐèÇó²»½ö¾ßÓÐÖ÷¹ÛÐÔ£¬¶øÇÒ¾ßÓÐÆÆ»µÐÔ¡£Òò´Ë£¬Àí½â¾Í´æÔÚ×ÅÈ«Ãæ´íÓõķçÏÕ£¬Òò´Ë¾ÍÐèÒªºóÐøµÄ²¹³¥¡£¡¶°Í±ðËþÖ®ºó¡·ÊÇһƪ·ÒëרÖø£¬ÌåÏÖÁË×÷Õß¹ØÓÚÓïÑÔºÍÎÄ»¯µÄ˼¿¼¡£×÷ÕßÔÚÓïÑÔ¡¢Ê«Ñ§¡¢ÓïÎÄÅúÆÀºÍÎÄ»¯Ê··½ÃæµÄ¹ã²©Ñ§Ê¶£¬Ê¹ËûºÜºÃµÄ½âÊÍÁË·ÒëÐÐΪ¡£ËûÖ¸³ö£¬ÓïÑÔÓÀÔ¶´¦ÓÚ¶¯Ì¬±ä»¯Ö®ÖУ¬¿ÚÒëºÍ±ÊÒ붼ÊÇΪÁËÈËÀàµÄ½»Á÷¡£ËûÌá³öÁË×Ô¼º¡°¶Ô·ÒëÐÐΪ¡¢ÒÔ¼°ÕâÒ»ÐÐΪÏÖÏóÂß¼ºÍÕÜѧ·½ÃæµÄÉîåäÀí½â¡±¡£
¡°After Babel postulates that translation is formally and pragmatically implicit in every act of communication, in the emission and reception of each and every mode of meaning, be it in the widest semiotic sense or in more specifically verbal exchanges¡± (ibid.:xii).¡°¡¶°Í±ðËþÖ®ºó¡·Ìá³ö£¬ÔÚÿһ´Î½»Á÷ÐÐΪÖУ¬ÔÚÿһ´ÎºÍËùÓеÄÒâÒåÐÎʽÊͷźͽÓÊܹý³ÌÖУ¬·ÒëÔÚÐÎʽºÍʵ¼ÊÉ϶¼ÊDz»Çå³þµÄ£¬²»¹ÜÊÇ×î¹ãÒåµÄ·ûºÅѧ»¹ÊǸüÌØÖ¸µÄÑÔÓï½»Á÷ÖС£¡±
Since Steiner¡¯s proposition of the hermeneutic approach to translation, translation scholars have come to further recognition of the nature of translation in light of the philosophical hermeneutics.ÔÚ˹̹ÄÉÌá³ö·ÒëµÄ²ûÊÍѧ·½·¨Ö®ºó£¬·Òëѧ
Õß¿ªÊ¼½øÒ»²½ÈÏʶµ½ÁËÕÜѧ²ûÊÍÊÓ½ÇϵķÒë±¾ÖÊ¡£
The Hermeneutic Motion
By George Steiner
The hermeneutic motion, the act of elicitation and appropriative transfer of meaning, is fourfold. There is initiative trust, an investment of belief, underwritten by previous experience but epistemologically exposed and psychologically hazardous, in the meaningfulness, in the ¡°seriousness¡± of the facing or, strictly speaking, adverse text. ²ûÊÍÔË×÷£¬¼´Æô·¢ÐÐΪºÍÒâÒåµÄÊʵ±×ª»»£¬
ʹһÖÖËÄÖØÐÔÐÐΪ¡£Ãæ¶ÔһƪÎı¾ÉõÖÁÊǶÔ×Ô¼º²»Àû»òÕß³äÂúµÐÒâµÄÎı¾Ê±£¬£¨ÒëÕߣ©Ê×ÏÈÒª¶ÔÎı¾ÒâÒåÄÚººÍÑϾþÐÔ¸øÓè³õ²½ÐÅÈΣ¬Ò²¾ÍÊÇÐÅÐĵÄͶÈë¡£ÕâÖÖÐÅÈÎÓÐÀµÓÚÏÈÇ°µÄ¾Ñ飬ÕâÔÚÈÏʶÂÛ²ãÃæÊÇÏÔ¶øÒ×¼ûµÄ£¬µ«ÊÇÔÚÐÄÀíÉÏÈ´´æÔÚÒ»¶¨µÄΣÏÕ¡£We venture a leap: we
grant ab initio that there is ¡°something there¡± to be understood, that the transfer will not be void. All understanding, and the demonstrative statement of understanding which is translation, starts with an act of trust. This confiding will, ordinarily, be instantaneous and unexamined, but it has a complex base. ÎÒÃÇ
ÇÒðÏÕÏòÇ°Ô¾³öÁËÒ»´ó²½£ºÎÒÃÇÒ»¿ªÊ¼ÈÏΪ¡°ÄÇÀïµÄijЩ¶«Î÷¡±ÐèÒªÀí½â£¬£¨¶ÔÒâÒåµÄ£©×ª»»²»»áºÁÎÞÒâÒå¡£ËùÓеÄÀí½â£¬ÒÔ¼°¶ÔÕâÖÖÀí½âµÄÍâÔÚ±íÊöµÄ·Ò룬¶¼ÆðʼÓÚÒ»ÖÖÐÅÈÎÐÐΪ¡£ÕâÖÖ±í´ïÒ»°ã¶øÑÔ¾ßÓÐ˲ʱÐÔ£¬Ò²Ã»Óо¹ýÑéÖ¤£¬µ«ÊÇÈ´¾ßÓзdz£¸´ÔӵĻù´¡¡£It is an
operative convention which derives from a sequence of phenomenological assumptions about the coherence of the world, about the presence of meaning in very different, perhaps formally antithetical semantic systems, about the validity of analogy and parallel. The radical generosity of the translator (¡°I grant beforehand that there must be something there¡±), his trust in the ¡°other¡±, as yet untried, unmapped alternity of statement, concentrates to a philosophically dramatic degree the human bias towards seeing the world as symbolic, as constituted of relations in which ¡°this¡± can stand for ¡°that¡±, and must in fact be able to do so if there are to be meanings and structures.
ÕâÊÇÒ»ÖÖ²Ù×÷Ï°¹ß£¬ËüÆðÔ´ÓÚһϵÁеıíÏó¼ÙÉ裨phenomenological
assumptions£©£¬°üÀ¨¶ÔÊÀ½çµÄÕûÌåÐÔ¡¢·Ç³£²»Í¬ÉõÖÁÐÎʽÉÏÏà¶ÔµÄ
¾ä·¨ÏµÍ³ÖÐÕ¹ÏÖµÄÒâÒå¡¢ÒÔ¼°Àà±ÈºÍ±È½ÏÕýµ±ÐԵıíÏó¼ÙÉ衣Ȼ¶øÔÚûÓг¢ÊԺͼƻ®Ê¹ÓÃÆäËûµÄ±íÊö֮ǰ£¬ÒëÕߵĿíºê£¨Ö®Ç°ÎÒ¾ÍÈÏΪÄÇÀï´æÔÚijЩ¶«Î÷£©£¬Ò²¾ÍÊǶԡ°ËûÕß¡±µÄÐÅÈΣ¬´ÓÕÜѧµÄ½Ç¶È¿´£¬ËüºÜ´ó³Ì¶ÈÉÏÊÇÈËÀàµÄÒ»ÖÖÆ«¼û£¬Ò²¾ÍÊÇ°ÑÊÀ½ç¿´×öÊÇ·ûºÅÐԵģ¬´æÔÚÁËijÖÖ¿ÉÒÔÓá°Õâ¸ö¡±Ìæ´ú¡°ÄǸö¡±µÄ¹Øϵ£¬¶øÇÒÖ»Òª´æÔÚÒâÒåºÍ½á¹¹£¬¾Í¿ÉÒÔÓÐÕâÖÖÌæ´úÐÐΪ¡£
But the trust can never be final. It is betrayed, trivially, by nonsense, by the discovery that ¡°there is nothing there¡± to elicit and translate. Nonsense rhymes, poesie concrete, glossolalia are