其他章节的案例、英文阅读材料和思考题见修订版增加内容的电子版和第二版第13-18章增加内容
第一章 涉外民事关系与国际私法
【案例1.1】一中国上海女子在美国纽约嫁给一印度孟买男子，婚后定居孟买并生儿育女。该女子不幸英年早逝，未留下任何遗嘱，但在上海和孟买均留下了价值可观的动产和不动产。其丈夫、子女及父母因析产不均发生争议，其父母诉诸上海市第一中级人民法院。
对于上述案件，上海市第一中级人民法院首先要确定这是一个国际私法案件还是国内民事案件，而确定国际私法案件的标准就是看案件所涉及的法律关系是否是涉外民事关系。从该案的事实看，站在中国的角度，继承关系的主体、客体以及继承关系发生的事实含有印度因素，因而这是一个典型的涉外继承关系，该案也是一个典型的国际私法案件。另外，与该案有关的中国女子与印度男子的夫妻关系，还含有美国因素。
【案例1.2】一中国人1995年死亡时在日本东京设有住所，并在东京留下若干动产，未立遗嘱，其继承人因析产不均诉诸日本法院。日本法院受理该涉外继承案件后，先要适用1989年修订的《日本法例》第26条关于“继承依被继承人本国法”的规定，从而认定应适用中国法律处理该涉外继承案件。但日本法院在案件审理过程中，查明中国《民法通则》第149条规定，遗产的法定继承，动产应适用被继承人死亡时住所地法律，把应适用的法律指回日本。这时，日本法院面临以下问题：究竟应依被继承人的本国法(中国法)还是他的住所地法(日本法)来处理这个继承案件呢?如果依中国法处理，是否违反日本的公共秩序？如果依日本法处理，是否能为中国继承人所接受，是否符合公正原则?等等。可见，法院在采用冲突规范调整涉外民事关系时，需要进行复杂的司法程序，判决的结果很难为当事人所预测。
【思考题】
1.下列案件涉及哪些民事关系？根据我国的法律，这些民事关系是否是涉外民事关系？
【案例1.3】“富山海轮”与波兰所属塞浦路斯船籍的集装箱船碰撞案
2003年5月31日格林尼治时间10点30分(北京时间18点30分)，在距丹麦博恩霍尔姆岛以北4海里的海域，中国远洋运输集团公司所属的“富山海轮”与一条波兰所属塞浦路斯船籍的集装箱船相撞，外轮撞到“富山海轮”左舷一、二舱之间，导致生活舱突然大量进水，“富山海轮”沉没，船上27名船员获救。
“富山海轮”船员离船前，封闭了船舶上所有的油路，避免了原油外溢造成严重的海域污染。“富山海轮”载有6.6万吨化肥，货主是中国农业生产资料集团公司，货物保险金额为870万美元。“富山海轮”船体保险金额为2050万美元。中国人民保险公司是“富山海轮”船体、货物的独家保险人。中国人民保险公司承保后，进行了再保险。“富山海轮”运载的货物出险后，中国人民保险公司迅速与国际再保险经纪人和再保险人取得联系，启动应急理赔程序，聘请律师等有关中介机构进行前期调查取证工作，分析事故原因，勘验定损，协助船东开展救助。 “富山海轮”出险后，中国人民保险公司于2003年6月6日决定预付赔款7000万人民币。“富山海轮”船体与货物保险金额为2920万美元，中国人民保险公司预计赔付金额在2亿元人民币左右，创我国国内海损赔付之最。
2.谈谈你对国际私法调整对象的理解。 3.如何正确理解国际私法的范围？ 4.试述国际私法的基本原则。 5.试述国际私法的性质。
6.你认为我国《民法通则》第142条中“国际惯例”所指为何？ 7.通过本章学习，你认为国际私法与国际经济法最大的区别在哪里？
【扩展性阅读材料】 1．韩德培、李双元：《应当重视对冲突法的研究》，《武汉大学学报（社会科学版）》1993年第6期。 2．李双元等：《关于国际私法的几个理论问题》，《中国国际私法与比较法年刊》（2001年卷），法律出版社2001年版。 3．李双元、欧福永：《国际私法研究方法之我见》，《法学论坛》2003年第3期。 4．李健男：《论国际私法的国际法因素》，《暨南学报》2005年第3期。 5．李健男：《论国际私法的社会基础》，《法学评论》2006年第5期。 6．林燕平：《对我国国际私法司法解释现象的法理分析》，《法学》2000年第5期。 7. Substantivism versus Selectivism2 1
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参见齐湘泉：《涉外民事关系法律适用法总论》，法律出版社2005年版，第2—3页；李双元、欧福永主编：《国际私法教学案例》，北京大学出版社2007年版，第7－9页。
（1）The Original Substantivist Method
The very name of our subject “conflict of laws”, and in particular “choice of law”, presupposes that in all cases that have contacts with more than one state: (a) each involved state has an active or passive desire or claim to have its law applied; (b) that these claims “conflict” in the sense of being of roughly equal intensity and validity; and (c) that the only way to resolve the conflict is to choose the law of one of the involved states.
Each of these premises has been seriously disputed in different periods in history. For example, the last of the above premises has been rejected by what is generally regarded as one of the first recorded methods of resolving multistate problems. That method, which was employed by the Roman praetor peregrinus in adjudicating disputes between Roman and non-Roman subjects, was based on the notion of a constructive blending of the involved laws rather than on a choice from among them. The praetor resolved these disputes by constructing and applying to the case at hand a new substantive rule of decision derived from the laws of both or all involved countries. Thus, the first instinct of the legal mind when confronted with a multistate private-law dispute was one of compromise rather than of choice, eclecticism rather than all or nothing. Instead of choosing the law of one of the involved states regardless of the outcome such a choice might produce for the particular case, the praetor would focus on the needs of that case and devise for it the most appropriate substantive solution, drawn from the laws of all involved states.
This substantivist method died out before the fall of the Roman empire and, by the time Roman law was “rediscovered” in Western Europe, the idea of choosing one of the involved laws rather than blending them had set in. The modern selectivist method was thus born and soon began to dominate the international scene.
（2）Contemporary Scholastic Substantivism
During the twentieth century, the substantivist method made a fairly momentous reappearance in international and interstate commercial arbitration, where it has become the preferred method among arbitrators. The result is the production of a voluminous, if not widely publicized, body of transnational, and at the same time a national, substantive law.
In the United States, the substantivist method has also acquired new and eloquent supporters in the writings of established academic commentators, including two participants in this Symposium, Professors von Mehren and Juenger.
Professor Arthur T. von Mehren has suggested that many true conflicts can be resolved expediently by a compromise of the conflicting policies of the involved states, rather than by a full vindication of the policies of the one state and a complete subordination of those of the other state. This compromise would take the form of a special substantive rule that would be constructed ad hoc for the case at hand and would be derived from the laws of both or all involved states. For example, a true conflict between the strict liability law of one state and the law of another state that does not impose liability could be resolved by a special substantive rule that would allow the recovery of only half of plaintiff’s actual damages, or of certain items only, such as medical expenses and loss of earnings.
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Symeon C. Symeonides, American Choice of Law at the Dawn of the 21st Century, Willamette Law Review, Vol. 37, 2001.
Professor Friedrich K. Juenger advocated a wider use of the substantivist approach. He proposed that conflicts of laws be resolved by constructing from among the involved states a rule of law that best accords with modern substantive-law trends and standards. For example, for products liability conflicts, Juenger proposed that, from among the laws of the places of conduct, injury, acquisition of the product, and domicile of the parties, the court should choose “[a]s to each issue . . . that rule of decision which most closely accords with modern standards of products liability.”
Finally, Professor Luther L. McDougal argued that, in constructing the ad hoc substantive rule of decision, courts should not confine themselves to the laws of the states involved in the conflict but should instead look beyond those laws and try to construct “the best” rule of law.
（3）Contemporary Judicial Substantivism
The above scholarly suggestions have not yet had any appreciable conscious following from the bench. However, Judge Jack B. Weinstein, another participant to this Symposium, came close to using the substantive-law solution when he proposed the development of a “national consensus law” for handling a complex product-liability class action brought by the victims of Agent Orange. In his contribution to this Symposium, Judge Weinstein seems to move in a different direction when he proposes the application of the law of the forum qua forum in a similar hypothetical case. Both of Weinstein’s proposals seem to be motivated by his profound disillusionment with the selectivist method as practiced in the United States. Such disillusionment on the part of a judge with this breadth and depth of conflicts experience should give all of us a reason for pause. This disillusionment is quite common among judges called upon to decide the complex “mega torts” discussed by Weinstein. Indeed, the selectivist method comes very close to the crashing point in coping with these cases and thus the thought of abandoning the method is entirely understandable. In ordinary single tort cases, however, the selectivist method remains dominant and its use is rarely questioned.
One possible exception to the judicial use of the selectivist method is the increasing use of dépe?age, namely the application of the laws of different states to different issues or aspects of the same cause of action. Dépe?age comes close to the substantivist method in that it leads to the creation of a hybrid substantive rule that does not exist as such in any of the involved states and that springs into existence only for the case at hand. Nevertheless, dépe?age differs from the substantivist method in that it is driven by selectivist rather than substantive considerations. It is not an intended substantive solution, but rather the unintended result of one feature of modern selectivist methods--their insistence in analyzing and resolving each issue separately (called “issue-by-issue analysis”).
On balance, the lack of contemporary judicial following of the substantivist method should not be surprising. One reason is the fact that for so long “[w]e have become so accustomed by tradition and theory to ideas of conflict, choice and selection.” A more serious reason, however, has to do with contemporary understandings about the appropriate role of judges and the hierarchy of sources of law. For, unlike some arbitrators, judges are expected to decide disputes according to law, not ex aequo et bono. The problem with the judicial version of the substantivist method is that it authorizes the retroactive application to unsuspecting litigants of a “law” that does not in fact exist anywhere until the moment the judge invents and utters it. Although it could be argued that this is no different than what judges have been doing in expanding the common law, the better view is that there is, at a minimum, a large difference in degree (the degree of pretension) and, more likely, an important difference in kind.
（4）Legislative Substantivism
In contrast, the substantivist method does not encounter the above difficulties when employed by the legislature, that is, by the body that has the unquestionable authority to promulgate new law that is meant to be applied prospectively only. During the twentieth century the substantivist method has been employed repeatedly in enacting uniform substantive rules intended to resolve multistate problems directly, without the intervention of choice-of-law rules.
At the international level, these rules originate in international conventions such as the 1980 United Nations Convention on the International Sale of Goods, which is now in force in 56 countries; the 1929 Warsaw Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules relating to International Carriage by Air; the 1956 Geneva Convention on the Contract for the International Carriage of Goods by Road; the 1964 Hague Convention on Uniform Sales Laws; and the 1973 Washington Convention Providing a Uniform Law on the Form of an International Will.
At the interstate level, one very productive source of uniform substantive rules is the National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws, which has produced approximately 200 uniform laws during the twentieth century. One of these uniform laws is the Uniform Commercial Code, which is now in force in all fifty states of the United States.
Obviously, by eliminating the multiplicity of substantive laws, the enactment of these uniform laws has also eliminated the possibility of conflicts of laws in the areas covered by the uniform laws. To that extent, the substantivist method has commensurably reduced the scope of operation of the selectivist method. This reduction is relatively small and, although it should continue to grow in the future, the growth will be slow. Thus, for the foreseeable future, the selectivist method will continue to dominate all efforts to resolve multistate conflicts of laws.
第二章 国际私法的历史
【案例2.1】美国马萨诸塞州的一个居民与该州的“杜威和阿尔米化学公司”缔结了一份书面雇用合同，同意他以化学工程师和化学家的身份替该公司在马萨诸塞州的实验室做研究工作。1935年9月，在雇用期中，雇主将其派往该公司在加利福尼亚州的一家分厂工作，作为暂时性的技术顾问以求改进雇主在那家分厂制造的产品的质量。他期望在他完成任务以后回到雇主在马萨诸塞州的实验室工作，但在此时，他不幸在加利福尼亚州遭到了伤害。于是，他便要求“加利福尼亚州工业事故委员会”判定“太平洋雇用保险公司”对其在被雇用期间于加利福尼亚州受到的伤害加以补偿。加利福尼亚州工业事故委员会因此责成该保险公司根据加利福尼亚州保险法所规定的保险补偿费对其进行补偿。
太平洋雇用保险公司则在加利福尼亚州地方上诉法院提出上诉，要求撤销加利福尼亚州工业事故委员会责成它对被雇用人的补偿。其根据有两点：第一，由于被雇用人是长期在马萨诸塞州的公司总部工作，而且只是暂时出差来加利福尼亚州并不幸遭受伤害的，所以他应当受马萨诸塞州工人补偿法的保护，而不应当受加利福尼亚州工人补偿法的保护；第二，加利福尼亚州工业事故委员会在适用加利福尼亚州法律的同时，拒绝给予马萨诸塞州法律以忠诚信用。然而，加利福尼亚州地方上诉法院驳回了该保险公司的上诉请求，美国最高法院也维持了原判。
在上述案件中，加利福尼亚州是侵权发生地，马萨诸塞州则是雇用关系合同缔结地。根据美国传统国际私法的规定，被雇用人的伤害应当适用雇用关系合同缔结地法，在该案中，也就是马萨诸塞州法律。然而，美国最高法院在该案中背离了美国传统国际私法理论所主张的方法，坚持适用侵权发生地法，即加利福尼亚州法律。美国最高法院之所以做出这一判决，在于它认识到，加利福尼亚州在该案中是侵权发生地州，而马萨诸塞州则是雇用关系发生地州，两个州对本案均有管辖权，且均有根据本州法律保护受雇佣者权利的利益。而法院地则刚好是侵权发生地的加利福尼亚州，而加利福尼亚州地方上诉法院显然认为，在本案中，该州的利益需要得到保护。
美国最高法院这一判决的意义在于，它表明只要法院地在该案中具有利益，那么它就可以适用法院地法，从而为“政府利益分析说”的出现和发展提供了肥沃的土壤。另一方面我们也可以看出，该学说在实践操作中很有可能导致法院地法的滥用。
【思考题】
1．巴托鲁斯何以被称为“国际私法之父”？ 2．萨维尼何以被称为“近代国际私法之父”？ 3
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该案的案情参见李双元、欧福永主编：《国际私法教学案例》，北京大学出版社2007年版，第30—32页。
3．试述当代国际私法的发展趋势。
【扩展性阅读材料】
1．李双元、吕国民：《萨维尼法学实践中一个矛盾现象之透视》，《浙江社会科学》2000年第2期。 2．韩德培、杜涛：《晚近国际私法立法的新发展》，《中国国际私法与比较法年刊》（2000年卷），法律出版社2000年版。
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3．Historical Roots: The Legacy of Savigny
These historical roots lie in the ideas of one of the greatest legal scholars of the nineteenth century, Friedrich Carl von Savigny. Savigny is primarily known as the founder of the historical school of jurisprudence and the great opponent of codification. Yet, he is also one of the fathers of modern conflicts law. Exactly 150 years ago, Savigny published volume VIII of his magnum opus, System des heutigen r?mischen Rechts. In this volume, he broke away from the unilateral method of the medieval statutists that had dominated for five hundred years and put private international law on a modern, multilateral foundation.
Conflicts rules, Savigny argued, must be neutral, i.e., they must not prefer particular parties, laws, or jurisdictions as such. To conform with this principle, he suggested that every legal relationship be governed by the law of the state or nation to which “it belongs, or to which it is subjected by virtue of its particular nature”, i.e., in which it has its “seat”. For Savigny, the idea of a such a “seat” of a relationship was only a metaphor for the best connection. He called it “a formal principle”, indicating that it needed to be filled with content under the circumstances of each case. With regard to obligations in particular, Savigny argued that in finding this connection, the primary factor should be the parties’ intentions. In the absence of a clear manifestation, these intentions should be inferred. Even objective choice-of-law criteria should reflect what the parties would have wanted had they thought about the problem. From these general premises, Savigny derived a concrete system of conflicts rules for international contracts.
The basic rule was freedom of choice. Savigny postulated that the parties to a contract should be allowed to select the applicable law. To be sure, this was not his original idea, but he nonetheless made it the centerpiece of his entire approach. He understood that the choice could be explicit or implicit. Of course, Savigny recognized that the parties’ freedom was not unbridled since they could not be allowed to escape certain mandatory norms.
In the absence of such a choice, Savigny called for objective rules that determine by neutral criteria which jurisdiction’s law will govern. In order to be neutral, these criteria had to be jurisdiction-selecting, i.e., independent of the content of the potentially applicable laws; they must also not give any preference to forum law nor to any party on grounds of his or her nationality. His basic principle reflects these aspirations: a contract was
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Mathias Reimann, Savigny’s Triumph? Choice of Law in Contracts Cases at the Close of The Twentieth Century, Virginia Journal of International Law Association, Vol. 39, 1999.
governed by the law of the jurisdiction to which the transaction most appropriately belonged. This most appropriate connection should be determined in careful consideration of all relevant circumstances. The answer could vary from case to case, but since Savigny did not wish to leave the result completely indeterminate, he provided a set of particular presumptions. In case of doubt, he thought that courts should resort to the place of performance, i.e., normally to the debtor’s domicile or principal place of business, since this was what the parties probably would have expected. Yet, in order to be more specific and to provide greater predictability, he distinguished between several kinds of contracts and considered different presumptions appropriate for each category. Of course, where necessary, these objective choice-of-law provisions had to yield to mandatory rules and to considerations of public policy.
Methodologically, Savigny attempted to steer a middle course between the Scylla of uncertainty and the Charybdis of inflexibility. This goal is evident in his overall approach where he combined a general principle--the seat of the legal relationship--with a list of factors guiding its application (domicile of the parties, location of property, place of certain acts, location of the forum). The striving for a combination of predictability and flexibility is even more obvious in particular areas of law, such as contracts. On the one hand, Savigny sought to provide guidance for the courts by concretizing his general approach through specific rules for the various types of contracts. On the other hand, he avoided rigidity by conceiving of these rules merely as generalized presumptions that could be overcome if the particular circumstances suggested a different result.
第二编 冲突法的基本制度
第三章 冲 突 规 范
【案例3.1】1908年英国奥格登案。一名住所在法国的19岁法国男子，未经父母同意，去英国与一住所在英国的英国女子结婚，后来该法国男子以自己结婚未经父母同意，因而不具备结婚能力为由，在法国一法院起诉并获得一宣告婚姻无效的判决，其依据是根据法国的规定“未满25岁的子女未经父母同意不得结婚”。而后该英国女子在英国与一个住所在英国的英国男子结婚。后与该女子结婚的英国男子(原告)却以他与该英国女子结婚时她还存在合法婚姻为由，请求英国法院宣告他们的婚姻无效。结果英国法院根据英国法的观点将法国法中“须经父母同意的要件”识别为“婚姻形式要件”，从而援引“婚姻形式依婚姻举行地法”这一冲突规范，确定英国法为准据法来解决是否需要父母同意的问题，而英国法中并没有法国法中的上述限制性规定，因此该英国女子与法国男子的婚姻是有效的。于是，英国法院否定了法国法院作出的宣告婚姻无效的判决，并且满足了英国男子的请求。
在上述案例中，如果英国法院依法国法将须经父母同意的要件识别为婚姻能力问题，就要适用英国法中另一条冲突规范——“婚姻能力适用当事人住所地法”，即法国法。而根据法国法，就应承认法国法院的宣告婚姻无效的判决，并驳回英国原告的请求。可见，由于各国对同一法律概念或同一事实性质的理解可能不同，就有可能将同一事实确定为不同的法律性质，从而可能会导致援引不同性质的冲突规范，并作出不同的甚至截然相反的判决。从本案可以看到，在国际私法中，识别乃是一个非常重要的问题。同时我们还可以看到，在国际私法案件中，法官还面临一个依据哪个与案件相关的国家的法律概念来进行识别的问题。
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【案例3.2】中国技术进出口总公司诉瑞士工业资源公司侵权损害赔偿纠纷上诉案。被上诉人中国技术进出口总公司受浙江省温州市金属材料公司的委托，于1984年12月28日与美国旭日开发公司签订购买9000吨钢材的合同。之后，旭日开发公司因无力履约，请求中国技术进出口总公司同意将卖方变更为上诉人瑞士工业资源公司。瑞士工业资源公司随即于1985年3月14日向被上诉人发出电传称：“货物已在装船港备妥待运”，“装船日期为1985年3月31日”，要求被上诉人“将信用证开给挪威信贷银行(在卢森堡)，以瑞士工业资源公司为受益人”。同年３月26日，上诉人又向被上诉人 5
参见李双元、欧福永主编：《国际私法教学案例》，北京大学出版社2007年版，第88－90页。
发出电传称：“所供钢材可能由我们的意大利生产厂或西班牙生产厂交货”，并告知了钢材的价格条款、交货日期等。1985年4月1日，双方签订了《合同修改协议书》，约定上诉人应在接受信用证后两周内装船待运。
1985年4月19日，被上诉人通知中国银行上海分行开出以上诉人为受益人不可撤销的信用证。随后，上诉人将全套单据通过银行提交被上诉人。同年６月１日，中国银行上海分行将上述货款汇付上诉人。货款汇付后，被上诉人因未收到上述钢材，向上诉人一再催促，上诉人全盘推卸自己的责任。
根据双方提供的证据证实，上诉人在意大利和西班牙既无钢厂，也无钢材；向被上诉人提交的意大利卡里奥托钢厂的钢材质量检验证书、重量证书和装箱单均系伪造。以上诉人为托运人并经其背书的提单上载明的装运船“阿基罗拉”号，在1985年内并末在该提单所载明的装运港意大利拉斯佩扎停泊过，从而证明上诉人并未将钢材托运装船，所提交的提单是伪造的。上诉人在答复被上诉人催问的电函中所称“中国港口拥挤”和“船舶将改变航线”的情况也纯属虚构。为此，被上诉人于1986年3月24日向上海市中级人民法院提起诉讼，要求上诉人返还货款、利息和经营损失等费用559万多美元，并申请诉讼保全。上海市中级人民法院准许被上诉人的诉讼保全申请，裁定冻结上诉人在中国银行上海分行的托收货款440万美元，查封了上述托收项下的全套单据。上海市中级人民法院经审理后判决瑞士工业资源公司应偿还中国技术进出口总公司的钢材货款、利息、经营损失及其他费用共计513万多美元，驳回瑞士工业资源公司的反诉。
上诉人不服一审判决，向上海市高级人民法院提出上诉称：双方签订的购销钢材合同中有仲裁条款。原审法院对本案无管辖权；原审法院裁定准许被上诉人诉讼保全申请，冻结上诉人的与本案无关的货款不当；上诉人被诉有欺诈行为并无事实依据；被上诉人在不同的法院对上诉人提出重复的诉讼不当；根据中国《涉外经济合同法》的规定，禁止间接损失，原判损害赔偿数额过高，并无事实和法律依据的支持，请求撤销原判。
上海市高级人民法院经公开审理确认：上诉人瑞士工业资源公司在无钢材的情况下，诱使被上诉人与其签订合同。上诉人利用合同形式，进行欺诈，已超出履行合同的范围，不仅破坏了合同，而且构成了侵权。双方当事人的纠纷，已非合同权利义务的争议，而是侵权损害赔偿纠纷。被上诉人有权向法院提起侵权之诉，而不受双方所订立的仲裁条款的约束。因本案侵权行为地在上海，依照我国《民事诉讼法(试行)》第22条关于“因侵权行为提起诉讼的，由侵权行为地人民法院管辖”的规定，以及该法第185条、第156条的规定，上海市中级人民法院对本案具有管辖权。上诉人提出的中国已加入《承认及执行外国仲裁裁决公约》，当事人签订的合同又有仲裁条款，中国法院无管辖权，其理由不能成立。被上诉人并未在其他法院对上诉人提出过侵权损害赔偿的诉讼，因此，也不存在重复诉讼的问题。上海市高级人民法院于1988年10月11日，判决驳回上诉人瑞士工业资源公司的上诉，维持原判。
该案件涉及国际私法方面的很多问题，如识别问题、管辖权问题、诉讼保全的适当性问题、重复诉讼的问题和损害赔偿额的确定问题等，但最重要也是最具争议的还是识别问题。如果法院将本案识别为合同纠纷（这很自然），由于合同有仲裁条款，我国法院便无管辖权；如果将本案识别为刑事犯罪，
6
则可提起刑事诉讼，实际上，瑞士法院已经对瑞士工业资源公司的负责人提起了刑事诉讼，所以被告在上诉中提出了重复诉讼的问题。结果我国法院将 6
参见肖永平：《国际私法原理》，法律出版社2003年版，第118页。
案件识别为侵权纠纷，并按我国《民事诉讼法（试行）》第22条关于“因侵权行为提起的诉讼，由侵权行为地人民法院管辖”的规定决定管辖权，从而排除了合同中约定的仲裁管辖权条款的效力。显然，我国法院是依据我国的法律观念将本案识别为侵权纠纷的，同时坚持了我国法院在平行诉讼情形下的一贯做法，即充分考虑原告对诉因的选择权。对于上海两级法院在本案中的做法，一直存在争议。中国《仲裁法》实施后，在后来的类似案件中，最高人民法院改变了原来对此所持的肯定态度。
【思考题】
1.在下列案例中，最高人民法院将双方之间的关系识别为信托关系是否合理？为什么？
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【案例3.3】广东省轻工业品进出口集团公司与TMT贸易有限公司商标权属纠纷上诉案
广东省轻工业进出口集团公司(以下简称“广轻公司”)分别于1979年和1980年与香港东明贸易有限公司(以下简称“东明公司”)签订两份“包销协议”，约定由东明公司定牌及包销广轻公司生产的TMT牌吊扇，吊扇所用TMT牌文字和图形组合商标由东明公司提供，由广轻公司在国内办理商标注册。1982年东明公司歇业，由香港TMT贸易有限公司（以下简称“TMT公司”）接手原东明公司与广轻公司的业务，也承受TMT商标。广轻公司并曾于1987年10月和12月向TMT公司发出两份文件证明广轻公司注册的1980年第142201号“TMT”商标以及其他相关的两个商标由香港TMT公司所有和受益，广轻公司只是作为受托人代表TMT公司持有此商标。1994年双方又签订一份协议，约定在中国境内，TMT商标由广轻公司注册，该公司有绝对的经营和管理权利，并负责处理境内任何假冒或侵犯该商标的行为。后来双方在履约中发生纠纷。1998年，TMT公司向广东省高级人民法院起诉，请求判令终止其委托广轻公司在国内注册和管理TMT商标的关系，并赔偿损失。
广东省高级人民法院经审理认定双方之间存在商标委托注册、管理的关系，依照《民法通则》及《民事诉讼法》中的有关规定，确认广轻公司注册的TMT商标归TMT公司所有，但TMT公司应向广轻公司作出一定的补偿。广轻公司不服，上诉到最高人民法院。在上诉审中，TMT公司答辩称广轻公司与TMT公司之间存在着事实上的信托法律关系。
1998年最高人民法院认为双方之间是信托关系而非单纯的委托关系。基于这种认定，最高人民法院在其判决中未援用被广东省高级人民法院作为法律依据的《民法通则》第5条以及关于代理的第65条第1款和第69条第2项，而仅以《民法通则》中规定诚实信用原则的第4条作为实体法律依据，作出基本上与广东省高级人民法院相同的判决。
2.有些学者认为冲突规范只是一种关于技术上的制度，而不是行为规范。你是否赞成？为什么？ 3.试述连接点的软化处理。
4.简述准据法表述公式的基本类型。 7
参见李双元、欧福永主编：《国际私法教学案例》，北京大学出版社2007年版，第106—108页。
5.试述国际私法中的法律选择方法。
6.你认为说国际私法的诞生就意味着法院地法的适用应受到合理限制？ 7.试论冲突法上的“实体正义”和“冲突正义”问题。 8.你如何理解“识别”在国际私法上的重要意义？
【扩展性阅读材料】 1．李双元：《21世纪国际社会法律发展的基本走势的展望》，《湖南师范大学社会科学学报》1995年第1期。 2．李双元、张明杰：《论冲突规范的软化处理》，《中国法学》1989年第2期。
3．李双元：《论国际私法关系中解决法律选择的方法问题》，《中国法学》1984年第3期。 4．胡永庆：《论法律选择方法的多元化》，《中国国际私法与比较法年刊》（2000年卷）。5．谢石松：《国际私法中识别问题新论》，《中国国际私法与比较法年刊》（1999年卷）。
6．“Conflicts Justice” Versus “Material Justice”8
(1) The fundamental theoretical dichotomy in the purposes of choice of law is between the objective of choosing the “proper” legal system to govern a multi-state dispute or the objective of reaching the fairest possible result in the individual case. It is clear that the traditional theory described in the preceding historical note purports to be jurisdiction-selective, with a leap in the dark to the legal system indicated by the critical connecting factor regardless of its content. It thus subscribes to the objective of “conflicts justice” versus “material justice”, although its critics based much of their attack on demonstrations that the courts were in fact avoiding blind jurisdiction-selection through such evasions as re-characterization of the legal category involved in the controversy, the defense of ordre public, or even use of renvoi. The modern theories, on the other hand, all purport in one way or another to take substantive justice into account. Since less than one fourth of the American states still adhere to the traditional theory, it must therefore be said that some form of pursuit of the objective of substantive justice is the prevailing view.
(2) The matter is greatly complicated, however, by the fact that the modern theories have no unified position on this question, but rather
represent points on a broad continuum. The range of these points is quite remarkable. The position closest to traditional theory is occupied by the jurisdiction-selective presumptions of the Second Restatement, but the opportunity to rebut these presumptions through reference to underlying policies and interests recognized by the General Principles of § 6 opens the door to an even greater variety of escapes than were available under traditional theory. According to the Symeonides survey, 23 states follow this approach or some substantial equivalent in tort cases, 29 in contract
8
See Courtland H. Peterson, Private International Law at the End of the Twentieth Century: Progress or Regress? 46 Am. J. Comp. L. 197 (1998, Supplement).
cases. Although this group may be said to be approaching a majority position, a significant number of the courts involved proceed to decide cases without a full examination of the factors which may bear on rebuttal of the presumptive rules of the Second Restatement. Five states have explicitly adopted Professor Leflar’s “choice-influencing-considerations” at least for some types of cases, including his proposed reference to “the better law”, but Leflar himself has been a leader in describing the eclecticism of American courts in this area. Only three states appear to be expressly committed to some form of governmental interest analysis. Two states simply presume the applicability of forum law, at least in torts cases. Some courts, notably those in New York, have attempted to distill workable guidelines from earlier precedents, but leave doubt as to the future scope of those concepts. Professor Symeonides includes New York, together with nine other jurisdictions, in a category which he calls “combined modern”. What these systems share, aside from eclecticism, is unclear, and they are perhaps best understood individually in terms of the cases and statutes to be found in each. Of particular interest is the recent comprehensive codification of conflicts rules in Louisiana, derived from both American and European sources.
(3) Although all of the modern theories purport to take underlying policy into account, and in that sense may said to be concerned with the
content of the law chosen rather than simply the system to which the chosen law belongs, there is great divergence in the extent to which the judge is empowered to make decisions based on fairness. The greatest latitude is obviously permitted by the better law theory, especially if “better law” is treated as a co-equal factor with the other “choice-influencing” considerations. At the other end of the spectrum are the states which presume the application of lex fori or use some form of interest analysis. Although the judges in question are directed by such theories to interpret the forum rules in light of the policies which they embody, the assumption is that forum law will be applied if the case falls within the scope of that policy--regardless of the fact that it may produce an unfair outcome in the individual case. Put another way, fairness is assured in such states only to the extent that forum law is fair. The bulk of the states resting in the middle of the spectrum are the states following the Second Restatement or some equivalent theory--these represent a clear majority of the modern-theory states and at least a plurality of all the states. These theories provide no express direction with respect to the discretion of the judge as to fairness, but the large number of factors which a court applying such a theory may consider may be said to expand the judge’s discretion to fashion a flexible response, and that response is therefore more likely to contain subjective assessments of fairness.
第四章 准据法确定中的几个一般性问题
【案例4.1】法国福果案。福果是一个于1801年出生在巴伐利亚的非婚生子，从5岁起随母亲移居法国，直到68岁时未留遗嘱而死亡。但他一直未取得法国法意义上的住所。其时，他的母亲和妻子均已死亡，他也没有子女，因此其旁系亲属向法国法院对福果在法国银行的一笔存款提出继承要求。根据法国冲突法，继承本应适用死者的本国法，即巴伐利亚法，按巴伐利亚继承法规定，其旁系亲属是有权继承该笔存款的。但法国法认为，本国冲突法指定的巴伐利亚法包括巴伐利亚的冲突法，而巴伐利亚的冲突法却规定继承适用死者死亡时的住所地法，且不分事实上的住所和法律上的住所，于是法国法院认为，福果的住所已在法国，故应适用法国法，依法国继承法的规定，福果既无直系亲属，又无兄弟姐妹，其他的旁系亲属是无继承权的。因而判定该笔存款系无人继承财产，收归了法国国库。
在本案中，法国法院通过采用狭义的反致制度，使本来应该适用外国法的涉外案件结果却适用了内国法，并因此获得了经济利益。可见，反致制度增大了内国法(也就是法院地法)适用的几率，法院国很有可能从中获得利益，这也是很多国家对狭义的反致制度比较热衷的主要原因。
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【案例4.2】李伯康房产继承案。李伯康于1938年在家乡台山与范女士结婚。1943年李伯康前往美国加利福尼亚州洛杉矶，1967年李伯康与周女士在美国内华达州结婚。1981年李伯康在美国洛杉矶去世。李伯康在广州有四层楼房。1986年5月，已在香港定居多年的范女士得知李伯康去世，遂到广州办理了继承上述房产的证明，并领取了房产证。周女士得知后，委托代理人在广州某区法院提起诉讼，要求继承李伯康的上述房产。法院依据《中华人民共和国婚姻法》判决李伯康与周女士在美国的结婚属于重婚，无效，驳回了原告的继承请求。
该案是否存在先决问题？对此，我们应按照先决问题的构成要件进行具体分析。本案中，尽管周女士能否继承李伯康在广州的楼房，取决于她与李伯康是否存在合法的婚姻关系，因此符合先决问题三大要件中的一项。但是，根据中国的冲突法，主要问题应适用中国法，即法院地法，不具备三大要件中关于“主要问题依法院国的冲突规则，应适用外国法作准据法”这一要件，故不存在先决问题。如果李伯康在广州某银行有存款，其他情形不变， 9
参见李双元、欧福永主编：《国际私法教学案例》，北京大学出版社2007年版，第93—95页。
此案就存在先决问题，我国法院可以根据我国的冲突规则来确定先决问题的准据法。
【案例4.3】鲍富莱蒙诉比贝斯柯案。法国王子鲍富莱蒙的王妃原系比利时人，因与王子结婚而取得法国国籍，后因夫妻关系不和而别居。由于1884年以前的法国法禁止离婚，王妃为了达到与法国王子离婚而与罗马尼亚比贝斯柯王子结婚的目的，只身前往允许离婚的德国并归化为德国人后，即在德国法院提出与法国王子离婚的诉讼请求并获得离婚判决。随后在德国与比贝斯柯王子结婚。婚后她以德国人的身份回到法国。鲍富莱蒙王子在法国法院提起诉讼，要求法国法院判决上述离婚无效。法国最高法院在判决中认为，虽然离婚应适用当事人的本国法，但王妃取得德国国籍的目的显然是为了逃避法国法中禁止离婚的规定，所以离婚判决是借法律规避行为取得的，应属无效，其后的再婚也当然无效。
从上述案例中，我们可以归纳出法律规避行为的四个构成要件：(1) 从主观上讲，当事人是有目的、有故意地规避某种法律；(2) 从规避的对象上讲，当事人规避的法律是本应适用的强行法或禁止性的规定；(3) 从行为方式上讲，当事人规避法律是通过有意改变连结点或制造某种连结点来实现的，如改变国籍、住所或物之所在地等；(4) 从客观结果上讲，当事人已经因该规避行为达到了对自己适用有利的法律的目的。
【案例4.4】海南省木材公司诉新加坡泰坦船务私人有限公司及达斌（私人）有限公司海上货物运输提单欺诈损害赔偿纠纷案。1988年7月20日，海南木材公司与新加坡达斌（私人）有限公司在海口签订木材购货合同，付款条件为银行即期信用证。1988年9月2日，中国银行海口分行依原告申请开具了信用证，并以电传通知了中国银行新加坡分行，该信用证规定了与合同约定一致的条款。1988年11月6日，被告泰坦公司签发了正本提单一式３份。同日，中国银行海口分行通知原告：达斌公司已将全套议付单证送达海口，要求承诺付款。原告经审单发现提单记载事项有诈，并经调查发现泰坦公司、达斌公司合谋伪造海运单证，企图欺诈货款，故要求中国银行海口分行暂不付款，同时向广州海事法院起诉，请求法院判令上述购货合同和该信用证项下的海运单证无效，并撤销该信用证。原告起诉时申请广州海事法院冻结中国银行海口分行1988年9月2日开具的以达斌公司为受益人的信用证。该院经审查认为原告的诉讼保全申请符合法律规定，裁定予以准许。广州海事法院通过审理，最后以违反我国公共秩序为由，排除了《跟单信用证统一惯例》的适用，于1990年9月29日缺席判决购货合同和提单无效；信用证项下的货款不予支付；被告共同赔偿原告经济损失人民币100多万元。
本案被认为是我国第一起运用公共秩序制度审理的涉外案件，在我国司法实务界和理论界引起了很大反响。人们争论的焦点在于我国法院运用公共秩序保留排除《跟单信用证统一惯例》的适用是否恰当。我们认为，以公共秩序为由排除《跟单信用证统一惯例》的适用是不恰当的。主要理由在于：第一，《跟单信用证统一惯例》是在国际商事交往的长期实践中形成的，并经过国际商会编纂而成文化的国际商事惯例，它形成的长期性，适用的广泛性足以表明它适应了国际商事交往对支付方式的特殊要求，法院国不宜将其解释为与本国的公共秩序相抵触，否则就等于宣告法院国的公共秩序不容许该
国际惯例的存在，这就无疑向国际社会表明，在这一方面，法院国是游离于国际商事交易惯例之外的；第二，国际商事惯例的适用本身就是任意性的，属于商人自治的范畴，一经当事人选用，法院国不宜过多干预。至于一些学者所持“国际惯例实际上已经具有国际习惯的性质，不宜借公共秩序条款排除其适用”的观点，是不能赞成的，因为这种观点混淆了国际商事惯例与国际习惯的区别。
该案判决的不当，一方面源于《民法通则》第150条的缺陷，另一方面也反映出我国法院对国际惯例认识上的某种误区，即不原意承认国际惯例的任何负面因素。其实，任何一项国际惯例，抑或任何一种法律制度和规则，都是一把双刃剑。我们不能因其有负面的因素，就从根本上否定其本质属性，如果硬要这么做，那就等于从根本上否定了这一制度和规则的自身。就《跟单信用证统一惯例》来说，“表面真实原则”和“独立抽象原则”构成了其本质属性，这也是其得以成为国际支付方面的国际商事惯例的根本原因，尽管这也确实为不法商人提供了进行诈骗的机会。从某种意义上说，这不仅不是它的缺陷，反而是它的优势所在，正基于此，国际商会在多次对《跟单信用证统一惯例》进行修订时，均没有改变上述两大原则。其实，针对信用证欺
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诈，《跟单信用证统一惯例》也规定了应对措施，即“欺诈例外”制度。
值得欣慰的是，最高人民法院已经注意到了我国公共秩序制度立法和司法实践中存在的问题。一个的例证就是，最高人民法院《第二次全国涉外商事海事审判工作会议纪要》中有关公共秩序的规定，已经表现出明显的进步。该纪要第54条规定，“适用外国法律违反中华人民共和国法律的基本原则和社会公共利益的，该外国法律不予适用，而应适用中华人民共和国的法律。”
【思考题】
1.下列案件中，二审法院查明外国法的做法是否适当？
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【案例4.5】南京华夏海运公司诉塞普路斯澳非尔提斯航运有限公司船舶碰撞案。
原告南京华夏海运公司所属“华宇”轮于1994年6月10日由印度尼西亚雅加达港空载驶往泰国曼谷港，被进港的被告所属的“珊瑚岛”轮撞击。事后经过日本海事协会检验，确认“华宇”轮丧失适航能力。由于修理，“华宇”轮停航66天。“珊瑚岛”轮撞船后离开了曼谷港，于1994年7月30日抵达中国南京港。原告于是申请武汉海事法院扣押该船舶，并向武汉海事法院起诉，要求被告赔偿损失175万美元。
一审中武汉海事法院对于法律适用问题认为，根据中国《海商法》关于涉外关系的法律适用原则，本案法律适用的第一选择是1910年的《统一船舶碰撞若干法律规定的国际公约》，但该《公约》对我国尚未生效，因此不能适用；第二选择是泰国法律，即侵权行为地法律，但因为双方当事人均不属于泰国籍，又不主张适用泰国法，视为当事人对泰国法不举证，因此泰国法不被适用；法院于是适用法院地法，即中国的《海商法》，判决被告赔偿原告80多万美元。
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所谓“欺诈例外”（fraud exception）制度，即在肯定信用证独立抽象原则的前提下，允许银行在存在欺诈的情况下，不予付款或承兑汇票，法院也可颁发禁止支付令。 参见李双元、欧福永主编：《国际私法教学案例》，北京大学出版社2007年版，第112页。
但其适用应符合以下条件：第一，欺诈必须是实质性的；第二，欺诈必须是现实存在的；第三，不能针对善意的受益人和正当的持票人。
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塞普路斯澳非尔提斯航运公司不服判决，向湖北省高级人民法院提起上诉。湖北省高级人民法院认为：根据中国《海商法》第273条第1款的规定，本案应当适用侵权行为地法律即泰国的法律。但本院依照最高人民法院《关于贯彻执行〈中华人民共和国民法通则〉若干问题的意见(试行)》第193条规定的途径未能查明泰国的有关法律。根据该条的规定，本案应适用中华人民共和国的法律。原审法院未完全依照前述规定查明泰国法即适用中华人民共和国的法律不妥，但事实认定正确，最后判决驳回上诉，维持原判。
2.你认为国际私法是否需要反致制度的存在？ 3.简述先决问题的构成要件。
4.程序问题为什么一般要适用法院地法？
5.请你根据中国区际法律冲突的特点，谈谈你对中国区际法律冲突解决途径的认识。
6.为什么说人际私法和时际私法所要解决的问题与国际私法所要解决的问题不是同一平面的问题？ 7.你认为法律规避问题是否是公共秩序问题中的一个部分？ 8.你认为中国现行的外国法查明制度应该如何改进？ 9.试评价中国的公共秩序保留制度。
【扩展性阅读材料】
1．粟烟涛：《冲突法上的法律规避》，武汉大学2004年博士学位论文。 2．黄进、杜焕芳：《“外国法的查明和解释”的条文设计与论证》，《求是学刊》2005年第2期； 3．李健男、吕国民：《对公共秩序保留制度的反思和展望》，《法学评论》1996年第4期。 4．Return of the Renvoi12
??
This analysis brings the discussion full circle. We saw in Part I that solving the renvoi problem turns on whether choice-of-law rules define the parties’ substantive rights or merely identify the law that does. Traditional choice-of-law scholars split on this question: some believed that choice-of-law rules define the parties’ substantive rights and therefore favored accepting the renvoi; others saw such rules as a procedural device for selecting a substantive law and thought that the renvoi should therefore be rejected. The problem was that neither group could defend its characterization of choice-of-law rules in a convincing manner.
Careful analysis of the choice-of-law process discloses an answer to this puzzle. Choice-of-law rules serve two purposes; they are both 12
Larry Kramer, Return of The Renvoi, New York University Law Review, October, 1991.
substantive and procedural, and the proper treatment of foreign rules varies accordingly. To the extent that choice-of-law rules define the scope of a state’s law, they are substantive, and the court should accept the renvoi. To the extent that choice-of-law rules choose between otherwise applicable substantive laws, they are procedural, and the court should instead reject the renvoi.
The problem is to determine when a state’s choice-of-law system serves each of these purposes. In the case of two-step approaches that explicitly disaggregate the two functions, this task is easy. The difficult cases arise when the foreign state uses a one-step approach that appears to merge the two steps. Careful analysis of these one-step approaches, however, suggests that they simply presume the substantive component (by presuming that both states’ laws are prima facie applicable), and offer rules to select the more appropriate law from a multilateral perspective. It follows, therefore, that the renvoi may be rejected.
I said at the outset that the renvoi raises a difficult theoretical challenge for choice-of-law scholars by forcing them to explain what it means to say that another state’s law applies. To resolve the renvoi problem, one must explain precisely how choice-of-law rules allocate lawmaking power. This explanation reveals choice-of-law rules not as external limitations on the power to prescribe, but rather as efforts first to define and then to accommodate the legitimate policy objectives of different states. In the final analysis, the only “right” choice-of-law rules are those that states actually accept, and a fully effective choice-of-law regime requires a broad consensus on how best to allocate legislative jurisdiction. It is through confronting the renvoi that courts may develop this consensus--evaluating each others’ approaches in an ongoing effort to find common ground.
第三编 国际私法的主体与法律行为及代理
第五章 外国人民事法律地位
【案例5．1】荷兰某贸易公司和江苏省某特殊钢绳厂买卖合同案。 1998年6月10日，荷兰某贸易公司（以下简称荷兰公司）向江苏省某特殊钢绳厂（以下简称钢绳厂）发来电传，邀请特殊钢绳厂向其报特殊钢绳的实盘。1998年6月12日，钢绳厂向对方发盘：B型号特殊钢绳1000公吨，每公吨1200美元CIF阿姆斯特丹，即期装运，不可撤销即期信用证。6月15日对方回电，要求将数量增到2000公吨，价格降为每公吨1100美元CIF阿姆斯特丹。6月17日钢绳厂回电，说明亚洲金融危机后，我方出口市场受到很大冲击，我方一直在微利经营，所报价格已经非常低，但考虑到贵方购买数量增加为2000公吨，价格可降为每公吨1150美元CIF阿姆斯特丹。6月20日对方回电，仍然要求降低价格。6月23日钢绳厂回电答复，价格仍为每公吨1150美元CIF阿姆斯特丹，但可以提供普惠制证书。
对方接到钢绳厂答复后，经研究认为，在提供普惠制证书的情况下可以享受优惠关税，从而降低其进口成本。因此，于6月28日回电表示无条件接受。
该案说明，中国出口商品在荷兰享有普遍优惠待遇，中国商品的竞争力因此得到提升。我国是发展中国家，目前已有英国、法国、德国、意大利、荷兰、卢森堡、比利时、爱尔兰、丹麦、希腊、葡萄牙、西班牙、日本、挪威、新西兰、澳大利亚、瑞士、瑞典、芬兰、奥地利、加拿大和波兰等国家对我国实行普惠制。根据大多数给惠国的规定，享受普惠制必须持凭受惠国政府指定的机构签署的普惠制原产地证书，我国政府指定各地出口商品检验机构签发普惠制原产地证书。
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参见李双元、欧福永主编：《国际私法教学案例》，北京大学出版社2007年版，第53－55页。
【思考题】
1．外国人民事法律地位制度在国际私法上的重要意义是什么？ 2．什么是普遍优惠待遇？
3．如何正确理解国民待遇原则？
【扩展性阅读材料】
1．李健男：《论特定国民待遇标准：关于我国近期对外国投资者及其投资待遇模式的思考》，《法律科学》1996年第5期。 2．梁淑英主编:《外国人在华待遇》，中国政法大学出版社1997年版。 3.The MFN Principle14
The unconditional most-favored-naion (MFN) provision is the cornerstone of the interantional trade rules embodies in the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT).
The basic rationale for MFN is that if every country observes the principle, all countries will benefit in the long run through the resulting more efficient use of resource. Furthermore, if the principle is observed, there is less likelihood of trade disputes.
MFN has sometimes been described as the “central” policy of GATT and the post World War II trading system. The fact that it is Article I of General Agreement reinforces that position.
“… any advantage, favor, privilege, or immunity granted by any contracting party to any product originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to like product originating in or destined for the territories of all other contracting parties.”
The princilple must be applied “uncontionally”. This means, for instance, that a state can invoke most favored treatment without granting in turn some advantage. In other words, the principle is not based on reciprocity. 3.The National Treatment Clause
The National Treatment obligation of the GATT, like the MFN obligation, is a rule nondiscrimination. In the case of MFN, the obligation prohibits discrimination as between the same goods from different exporting countries. The national treatment clause, in contrast, imposes the principle of nondiscrimination as between domestically produced goods and the same imported goods. It is a central feature of international trade rules and policy, and exists within the GATT system 14
摘自肖永平：《国际私法原理》，法律出版社2003年版，第73页。
to prevent government practices which evade the tariff obligations.
Article III is the central national treatment obligation of General Agreement, which establishes the general principle that internal taxes and regulations “should not be applied… so as to afford protection to domestic production.”
第六章 自然人
【案例6.1】荷兰公民马克行为能力确认案。荷兰籍男青年马克，21岁，1997年来中国旅游，在某风景区一户少数民族农家，看中一套当地人的民族服装。经协商，以随身携带的照相机与之互易。马克打电话给好友，告知此事。其朋友称这笔交易不合算，劝马克把照相机换回来，马克回到农家商谈返还之事，农家不同意。马克遂以自己时年不满23岁，按其本国法（荷兰法律规定23岁为成年年龄）尚未成年，不具有完全民事行为能力，所为民事行为无效为由，诉至我国法院。
本案涉及涉外案件中自然人行为能力的法律适用问题。根据最高人民法院《关于贯彻执行＜中华人民共和国民法通则＞若干问题的意见（试行）》第180条的规定，马克的行为能力应适用行为地，即中国的法律来认定。马克现年21岁，按中国法律年满18周岁的正常人为完全民事行为能力人，马克具有完全民事行为能力，不得主张合同无效。
【思考题】
1. 中国法院对下列案例是否有管辖权？有管辖权的法院应适用何国法律？
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【案例6.2】丈夫国外打工期间妻子申请宣告其死亡案
北京石景山居民杨永平指控妻子王梅为达到重婚目的，恶意向法院申请宣布在日本打工的自己死亡，因此他将王梅告上法庭，请求法院追究王梅重婚的刑事责任。石景山区人民法院受理了这桩离奇的自诉重婚案。
杨永平介绍，1993年11月1日，他与王梅自由恋爱结婚。婚后不久，他被单位派往日本研修2年。在日期间，妻子王梅多次来信，劝说他为了将来的前途留在日本。于是，在学习期满后，离开研修单位的他滞留在日本，开始了打工生活。
在日打工期间，杨永平先后给国内的王梅汇款800万日元(约合人民币56万元)。2001年起，王梅态度大变，说不认识杨永平，要杨永平不要再骚扰她。2002年，杨永平被日本政府以非法滞留的名义遣返回国。回国后，王梅对杨永平避而不见。2003年年底，在杨永平的要求下，法院判决两人离婚， 1516
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参见李双元、欧福永主编：《国际私法教学案例》，北京大学出版社2007年版，第125－126页。 参见李双元、欧福永主编：《国际私法教学案例》，北京大学出版社2007年版，第123—124页。
并确认了“婚前财产归杨永平所有，王梅还需给付杨永平23万元”的财产处理方式。
王梅不服判决提出上诉，声称她早以杨永平下落不明为由，向法院申请宣告杨永平死亡。2002年12月，法院经过公告寻人无线索已经宣告杨永平死亡。2003年3月，王梅又与他人登记结婚，因此不存在离婚一说，要求撤销这一判决。
获悉自己曾经“死去”的情况后，杨永平大怒。他再次走进法院，指控王梅在婚姻关系存续期间，故意隐瞒事实真相，恶意宣告他死亡，以达到重婚目的，其行为已涉嫌重婚罪，请求法院撤销对自己的死亡宣告，追究王梅的刑事责任，并要求赔偿损失10万元。
2004年12月15日，石景山区人民法院因考虑到王梅尚在哺乳期内，故判处王梅拘役6个月，缓刑1年，同时判决王梅与他人的婚姻无效。 2.同样是解决国籍冲突，国际私法与国际公法有何不同？ 3.简述住所与国籍、居所和惯常居所在法律上的区别？ 4.简述自然人权利能力法律适用的主要做法。
5.为什么在某种情况下需要采用行为地法来判定自然人的行为能力？ 6.如何处理连接点改变后的自然人行为能力的问题？
【扩展性阅读材料】
1．刘益灯：《惯常居所：属人法趋同化的必然选择》，《中南工业大学学报（社会科学版）》，2002年第3期。 2．Habitual residence17
This connecting factor has been employed in several statutes, some of which are based upon international conventions which employ the term either in addition to, or in place of, domicile.Thus, it is used as an alternative to domicile in respect of the jurisdiction of the English courts to grant decrees of divorce, judicial separation and nullity of marriage, and in respect of the law governing the formal validity of wills. It is used as an alternative to domicile and nationality as a basis for the jurisdiction of a foreign court when recognition of an overseas divorce is in issue. It has relevance in the choice of law rules for contract and plays a part in the laws of taxation, immigration and social security.
In Cruse v. Chittun, an early case which concerned the recognition of an overseas divorce, habitual residence was said to denote “regular physical presence which must endure for some time”. In several cases, the courts have said that it is a question of fact; this has turned out to be over-optimistic and, unavoidably, perhaps, legal rules have developed.
Some principles were stated by Lord Brandon in the leading case. Habitual residence must be understood in the natural and ordinary meaning of those words and is a question of fact to be decided in the light of the circumstances of the case. Unlike domicile, it cannot be acquired in a single day, since “appreciable period of 17
J. G. Collier, Conflict of Laws, Cambridge University Press, 3rd ed., 2001, pp.55-57.
time and a settled intention to reside on a long-term basis” are necessary. The “settled intention” need not be an intention to stay in the country permanently or indefinitely. Like domicile, it is immediately lost by leaving a country with a settled intention not to return.
Although in several cases, habitual residence has been said to differ not at all from ordinary residence, there are at least two differences between them. A person can have only one habitual residence but may have more than one ordinary residence at any one time. Whereas ordinary residence can be acquired in a single day, habitual residence needs an appreciable period of time.
Habitual residence differs from domicile in several respects. It is not ascribed to a person at birth; the intention required for its acquisition is different and a previous habitual residence does not revive on the abandonment of one which has been subsequently acquired. It is, however, abandoned in the same way as domicile is abandoned. Therefore, a person can be without a habitual residence.
As regards the habitual residence of children, the fact that a child may be without one may deprive him or her of the protection of the Child Abduction and Custody Act 1985 if he or she is aducted. Most of the reported cases about habitual residence have been decided under this Act. The courts have held that a child’s habitual residence may change with that of parent with whom the child lives and who is exercising rights of custody. If the parents live together and the child lives with then, he or she has their habitual residence. If they have joint responsibility, neither can change the child’s habitual residence by wrongfully removing or retainting the child in breach of the other party’s rights. Both parents must consent. A court order may change the child’s habitual residence. If one parent has lawful custody his or her habitual residence is also that of the child. If the child is made a ward of court, the court’s consent is needed to change the child’s habitual residence. This habitual residence “of dependence”, like that of domicile, probably ceases at the age of sixteen.
第七章 法人
【案例7.1】华盛昌财务有限公司与立丰实业有限公司信用证纠纷案。被告香港海伟投资有限公司为向芬兰科恩公司购买电梯，与原告香港立丰实业有限公司（以下简称立丰公司）于1994年1月12日签署代开信用证协议，金额为239万德国马克（按开证当天汇率折算成美元），所有开证费用由海伟公司承担，海伟公司按开证金额的4%向立丰公司支付手续费，海伟公司于交货前七天将与信用证一致的美元电汇到立丰公司指定帐户，如逾期，从立丰公司垫付款之日起支付利息，利率按年息9%计算。该协议同时约定海伟公司应向立丰公司出具由上诉人香港华盛昌公司提供的担保函。同日，华盛昌公司向立丰公司出具了盖有华盛昌公司印章及其总经理于华签名的保函。该保函称，华盛昌公司为海伟公司在前述协议中所应履行的义务和责任进行担保，担保有效期为前述协议签订日至1994年12月31日，在此期间由于海伟公司未能履行的义务和责任将由华盛昌公司承担。后来立丰公司依约申请中国银行香港分行于1994年1月17日开出了不可撤销跟单信用证。但海伟公司未按代开信用证协议于科恩公司交货前七日将资金电汇至立丰公司指定帐户，欠立丰公司代开信用证资金1,177,175.96美元及利息、开证手续费9.56万德国马克。
被告华盛昌公司答辩称，华盛昌公司当时的于华总经理在签署保函时未经华盛昌公司董事会的授权。于华签的保函没有约因，于华超越权限出具保函，因此保函无效，同时诉讼已过诉讼时效。
本案涉及的主要问题是华盛昌公司是否需要承担担保责任，涉及的法律关系是担保关系。由于保函并未约定法律适用，根据中国《民法通则》第145条第2款的规定，应依据最密切联系原则决定应该担保关系应适用的法律。而在该案中，三方当事人均为香港公司，保函也在香港开立，故应适用香港法律。但是，该案还涉及到一个先决问题，即华盛昌公司当时的于华总经理在签署保函时是否有华盛昌公司董事会的授权及其效力问题，也需要单独确立应适用的法律。显然，该先决问题属于华盛昌公司的内部事务，应当适用公司的属人法即香港的公司条例，根据香港的公司条例，总经理拥有此项权利。所以，重庆高级人民法院最后判决支持了原告海伟投资有限公司的诉讼请求。
【思考题】
1. 在下列案件中，香港绿谷公司根据股东大会决议提起诉讼的行为是否有效？应根据何地法律作出上述判断？
18
18
参见杜涛：《国际经济贸易中的国际私法问题》，武汉大学出版社2005年版，第127－128页；中国重庆市高级人民法院民事判决书（2002）渝高法经二终字第96号。
【案例7.2】案例五：香港绿谷公司和加拿大绿谷公司、郝晓荧股权纠纷案
1991年中国法人上海华申公司与加拿大英明公司和香港凯怡公司合资成立上海绿谷公司。后香港凯怡公司更改为香港绿谷公司，其在上海绿谷公司的55％股权均转移给香港绿谷公司。郝晓荧为香港绿谷公司股东之一。该股权转让协议经上海市外资委批准。1995年加拿大绿谷公司和郝晓荧向上海市有关部门出具“关于香港绿谷公司更名为加拿大绿谷公司的说明”，并将上海绿谷公司中香港绿谷公司的股权转移给加拿大绿谷公司，并经过上海市有关部门批准。后香港绿谷公司在香港召开股东大会，有三名股东出席，授权股东黄光明等人向上海市高级人民法院起诉，认为加拿大绿谷公司侵占了其在上海绿谷公司的股权，请求法院判决被告加拿大绿谷公司返还股权。但被告股东之一郝晓荧和另一名股东未出席股东大会，于是郝晓荧以香港绿谷公司的起诉未经过半数股东出席而无效为由，也以香港绿谷公司名义要求上海市高级人民法院撤销起诉。
一审法院判决认为原告的起诉行为经公司多数股东同意有效，判决被告加拿大绿谷公司败诉。被告不服，向最高人民法院提起上诉，认为原告的起诉行为不符合香港公司条例的规定。
……
2.试述法人国籍的确定。 3.如何确定法人的住所？
4.简述法人属人法的适用范围。
【扩展性阅读材料】 1．萧凯：《论公司属人法的确定》，《中国国际私法与比较法年刊》（2003年卷）； 2．Companies’ Status and domicile
The personal law of a company is that of its domicile, which means the law of the place of its incorporation. To this it owes its existence, and that law governs also its dissolution and its capacity to contract. The law of the place of incorporation dictates who can sue (or cause it to sue) and be sued on its behalf, and governs the extent to which a member can be personally liable for its debts. It also governs its status after an amalgamation.
In National Bank of Greece and Athens SA v. Metliss
Sterling mortgage bonds governed by English law were issued by a Greek bank in 1927 and guaranteed by the National Bank of Greece, a Greek bank. In 1941 payment of interest on the bonds ceased. In 1949 the Greek Government passed a moratorium extinguishing liability on the bonds. In 1953 another Greek decree amalgamated the National Bank with the Bank of Athens into a new bank, the National Bank of Greece and Athens, which the decree declared to be the “universal successor” of the two banks. In 1955 a bondholder claimed arrears of interest from the new bank. 19
19
参见李双元、欧福永主编：《国际私法教学案例》，北京大学出版社2007年版，第127—128页。
The House of Lords held that he could do so, since the status of the new bank and the effects thereof were governed by Greek law. The moratorium law was said not to have affected the old bank’s liability since that was a matter for the proper law of the contract, English law. Subsequently, a decree provided that this status should not carry with it liability under the bonds. But the House of Lords held that this affected the obligations thereunder, and since these were governed by English law the new Greek decree was irrelevant.(It was also said that if it had affected status, it would be disregarded in so far as it was meant to have retrospective effect.)
第九章 法律行为与代理
【案例8.1】韩国海南实业公司与山东省威海市化工进出口有限公司上诉案。2001年6月，韩国海南实业公司与威海化工进出口公司口头协商，海南实业将其收购的活鲈鱼苗委托威海化工出口到韩国，但威海化工是否负有租船及找船的代理义务，双方未明确约定。2001年6月28日，威海化工与烟台文丰签订租船合同，约定租船时间、租船方式和付款方式等事项。海南实业向威海化工汇款40多万元用于支付代理费和运费等。2001年7月4日，海南实业将其收购的26万尾活鲈鱼苗装船，并取得了烟台文丰签发的正本提单三份。但鱼苗随后大量死亡,承运人因此未按照约定将货物运抵韩国。海南实业以威海化工为被告向威海市中级人民法院提起诉讼。
一审法院认为：海南实业与威海化工虽未签订书面合同，但根据双方的口头约定及商检、报关及运费均由海南实业承担看双方形成的是一种委托代理出口关系，应认定为合法有效。威海化工按双方口头约定履行了代理职责。按照我国外贸代理的有关规定，只有海南实业向威海化工提供了相关费用，而威海化工不行使索赔权利，或在诉讼时效期间内未向第三人提起诉讼或仲裁，由此给海南实业造成损失的才承担民事责任。根据我国新合同法的有关规定，法院一审判决驳回海南实业的诉讼请求。海南实业不服判决，提出上诉。在上诉审期间，海南实业与威海化工协商选择中华人民共和国法律处理本案争议问题。
此案的准据法如何确定？首先，法院要对案件进行识别。根据识别的理论，通常依照法院地法进行识别。根据我国法律，本案应当识别为涉外代理关系：被代理人（本人）为韩国法人海南实业，代理人为威海化工，相对人为烟台文丰。海南实业与威海化工之间的关系为代理内部关系，受双方之间的委托合同支配；威海化工以自己名义与烟台文丰之间签订货物运输合同，根据《合同法》第402条和第403条，构成隐名代理关系，该合同直接约束海南实业和烟台文丰，双方之间的关系为代理的外部关系。
对于法律适用，应当区分代理的内部关系和外部关系。本案中，由于原告只对被告提起诉讼，因此只涉及到代理的内部关系。根据国际私法原理，代理的内部关系适用双方委托合同准据法。根据我国合同法，合同适用当事人协议选择的法律。本案中双方协议选择中国法律，应当适用中华人民共和国《民法通则》和《合同法》的规定。
【思考题】
1. 下列案件应如何确定准据法？
【案例8.2】尼珈多次地产公司诉昆士兰房地产公司案
澳门尼珈多次地产公司与澳大利亚昆士兰房地产公司签订了一份代理协议，由尼珈多次地产公司作为昆士兰房地产公司的代理人，在澳门和东南亚
寻找买主购买位于澳大利亚昆士兰州的土地。双方在代理协议中约定该协议适用澳门法律。后来，尼珈多次地产公司因其收取佣金的要求得不到满足，就在澳大利亚的法院对昆士兰房地产公司提起诉讼。被告主张原告不能取得代理佣金的理由是，原告并未按昆士兰州法律的要求获得充当不动产代理人的许可证，而且，代理协议规定的佣金额已超过昆士兰州法律所允许的最高限额，不遵守该法的规定是要被处以罚款的。
2.你认为为什么法律行为的法律适用要区分实质要件和形式要件两个方面？ 3.简述法律行为形式要件准据法的选择方法。 4.论代理的法律适用。
5.试述《代理法律适用公约》的主要内容。
【扩展性阅读材料】
1．郑自文：《国际代理法研究》，法律出版社1998年版。 2．Chioce-of –law by Principal and Agent20
In Article 5 of the Hague Agency Convention the widely accepted principle of party autonomy, allowing the parties to determine the law governing their contractual relationship themselves, has been fully recognized. It reads as follows: “The internal law chosen by the principal and the agent shall govern the agency relationship between them. This choice must be express or must be such that it may be inferred with reasonable certainty from the terms of the agreement between the parties and the circumstances of the case.”
Under Article 5 HAC the parties are free to choose any law whatsoever to govern their relationship. It is not required that the chosen law has any connetion with the agency relationship nor that the law which would otherwise have been applicable (i.e. as a rule the law of the country where the agent has its business establishment) is set aside in its entirely, including its rules which iin domestic cases cannot be derogated from by contract.
There are, however, some restrictions on the parties’ freedom to select the law governing their contract. Firstly, only in situations where one is dealing with relationship of an international character is a choice-of-law pursuant to Article 5 permitted. In the second place, courts may apply the mandatory rules of any country with which the agency agreement has a significant connection to the extent that these mandatory rules claim application in international cases. Finally, the application of the law chosen by the parties may be refused by the courts in situations where such an application would be manifestly incompatible with the forum’s public policy.
Under Article 5 a Chioce-of-law can be either express or implied. The Preliminary Draft Convention provided that the choice-of-law should arise from the terms of the contract and the circumstances of the case “by necessary implication”. This formula was regarded as being too inflexible. After elaborate discussions it was 20
摘自肖永平：《国际私法原理》，法律出版社2003年版，第265页。
decided that the words “by necessary implication” would be replaced by “with reasonable certainty”. Thus the courts are given a certain degree of freedom to inter a choice-of-law from the terms of the agreements and the circumstances of the case.
第二十二章 国际商事仲裁
【案例22.1】丽都饭店仲裁裁决执行案。中国国际工程咨询公司（以下简称“咨询公司”）与北京丽都饭店公司（以下简称“丽都饭店”）于1984年1月30日至1985年6月10日，先后签订了关于丽都饭店俱乐部工程、丽都饭店三栋六层公寓、三栋十五层公寓的三个工程承包合同。合同均规定：双方在执行合同中所发生的一切争议应通过友好协商解决，如协商不能解决时，应提请在北京的中国国际贸易促进委员会对外经济贸易仲裁委员会（现名为中国国际经济贸易仲裁委员会）进行仲裁。
1990年8月20日，咨询公司以丽都饭店长期拖欠工程款为由，向中国国际经济贸易仲裁委员会提出仲裁申请，要求丽都饭店支付工程欠款及延迟付款的利息。中国国际经济贸易仲裁委员会于1991年11月1日作出（91）贸仲字第2569号裁决：丽都饭店应于1991年12月31日前将所欠工程款以及其他工程费用共计885,171.50美元以及利息520,000美元支付给咨询公司。1992年1月15日，咨询公司以丽都饭店未履行仲裁裁决为由，向北京市中级人民法院申请执行仲裁裁决。
北京市中级人民法院立案后，于1992年2月1日向丽都饭店发出执行通知，责令该公司自觉履行仲裁裁决中确定的义务。2月9日，丽都饭店以咨询公司与丽都饭店均为中国法人，双方发生的工程承包合同纠纷属国内经济合同纠纷，不属于中国国际经济贸易仲裁委员会仲裁案件受理范围，该仲裁委员会无权进行仲裁为理由，向北京市中级人民法院提出书面《抗辩执行仲裁裁决状》，请求对中国国际经济贸易仲裁委员会的仲裁裁决不予执行。对此，中国国际经济贸易仲裁委员会认为，丽都饭店是内地与香港合资经营企业，具有涉外因素；丽都饭店与咨询公司签订的工程承包合同中订有仲裁条款，出现争议后，双方都自愿接受仲裁，且在仲裁过程中，双方均未提出异议，所以仲裁委员会可以受理，并有权进行仲裁。
北京市中级人民法院经审查后认为，丽都饭店是中国旅行社总社与香港益和有限公司共同出资，并在国家工商局申请注册登记的合资经营企业，丽都饭店与咨询公司均为中国法人，双方之间发生的工程承包合同纠纷系国内经济合同纠纷，不具有涉外因素，并非国际经济贸易中发生的争议。按照《中国国际经济贸易仲裁委员会仲裁规则》的规定，该案不属于中国国际经济贸易仲裁委员会案件受理范围。因此，丽都饭店对执行仲裁裁决提出的异议有理。依照中国《民事诉讼法》第260条第1款第4项的规定，北京市中级人民法院于1992年12月23日作出裁定：申请执行人中国国际工程咨询公司向本院申请强制执行的仲裁委员会（91）贸仲字第2569号裁决书不予执行。
应该认为，北京市中级人民法院是按当时中国有关的法律认定的，并非毫无根据。但是如果从前述国际社会的普遍实践和学理上来解释，该争议应
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该是属于国际性的商事争议。同时，现在中国国际经济贸易仲裁委员会和依1994年《仲裁法》组建的仲裁机构都能够受理涉外和纯国内案件了。
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参见李双元、欧福永主编：《国际私法教学案例》，北京大学出版社2007年版，第429－431页。
【案例30.2】香港龙海（集团）有限公司（以下简称“龙海公司”）于1993年2月与武汉东湖新技术开发区进出口公司（以下简称“东湖公司”）签订“金龙科技发展有限公司合营合同”，双方约定在中国武汉合资建立金龙科技发展有限公司，该合同规定，与合同有关的一切争议应提交中国国际经济贸易仲裁委员会（下称CIETAC）仲裁。同年12月，武汉中苑科教公司（下称中苑公司）与东湖公司签订协议，东湖公司将其在合资公司的全部股权转让给中苑公司。中苑公司同时还与龙海公司签订了一份“协议书”，规定由中苑公司替代东湖公司作为合资公司的中方，合资公司名称亦改为武汉金龙高科技有限公司，新的合资公司承担原合资公司的债权债务。“协议书”还对原合资公司章程和合资合同中的投资额、注册资本、经营范围作了修改，但未对原合资合同中的仲裁条款进行约定。中苑公司与龙海公司以该“协议书”和原合资合同、章程办理了变更审批手续，工商行政管理部门审批备案的合同也是龙海公司与东湖公司签订的合资合同和龙海公司与中苑公司签订的“协议书”。后来双方因履行上述合同和协议书发生争议。龙海公司申请仲裁，而中苑公司向武汉市中级人民法院（下称武汉中院）申请确认仲裁条款无效。
基于以上案情，武汉中院认为，中苑公司与龙海公司签订的“协议书”是对龙海公司与东湖公司之间的合资合同的认可和部分更改，该协议书并未
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明确规定仲裁条款，由于仲裁条款具有相对独立性，并根据《承认及执行外国仲裁裁决公约》（即《纽约公约》）的有关规定，原合同中的仲裁条款对该合同的受让人无法律效力。龙海公司称其与中苑公司签订的“武汉金龙高科技有限公司合资合同”第40条为仲裁条款，但该公司不能提交合同正本，工商行政管理部门也无备案，中苑公司否认该事实，故龙海公司申请仲裁没有有效的合同依据。依照中国《仲裁法》第18、19、20条和《民事诉讼法》第140条第11项，裁定龙海公司所依据的“武汉金龙高科技有限公司合资合同”的仲裁条款及“协议书”，不能作为确认双方接受CIETAC管辖权的依据。
龙海公司不服裁定，CIETAC亦向最高人民法院反映情况。最高人民法院认为武汉中院的裁定是错误的，并指令湖北省高级人民法院按审判监督程序予以纠正，后者已于1999年初作出终审裁定，肯定了CIETAC对该案的管辖权。
【思考题】
1.下列案件中，谁有权对仲裁协议的效力进行确认？如何确定仲裁协议的准据法？既约定了仲裁又约定了诉讼的仲裁协议是否有效？
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【案例22.2】铁行渣华有限公司诉华兴海运(中国)托运有限公司案
1998年5月，铁行渣华有限公司向华兴海运(中国)托运有限公司托运10个集装箱的货物，装于“Guang Bin Ji 74”轮由香港运到广东云浮六都，华兴海运(中国)托运有限公司于1998年5月16日在香港签发提单，提单号为74/9805LD02。该提单背面条款第2条内容为JURISDICTION:All disputes arising under or in connection with this Bill of Lading shall be determined by Chinese Law in the courts of，or by arbitration in，the People’s Republic of China.中文 指该公约第4条的规定：“为了获得??承认与执行，申请承认与执行裁决的当事人应该在申请的时候提供：??（2）第2条述及的（仲裁）协议的正本或经正式证明的副本。” 23
李双元、欧福永主编：《国际私法教学案例》，北京大学出版社2007年版，第448－452页。
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译文：“管辖权：所有因此提单产生的争议应按照中华人民共和国法律在中华人民共和国法院审理或在中华人民共和国仲裁。”铁行渣华有限公司与华兴海运(中国)托运有限公司事后没有关于仲裁的补充协议。
2000年2月15日，铁行渣华有限公司和铁行渣华(香港)有限公司向中华人民共和国广州海事法院提出申请，请求法院确认提单仲裁条款无效。对此，华兴海运(中国)托运有限公司认为该提单背面条款第2条规定了“管辖权”，该司法管辖条款是有效的，反请求法院裁定该提单中第2条中关于法律适用和司法管辖部分有效。
审理该案的合议庭认为：本案属涉外案件，对仲裁协议的效力作出认定，属于程序性问题，依照我国1986年12月2日加入的《承认与执行外国仲裁裁决公约》第5条第1项规定的精神，确定仲裁协议效力的准据法的基本原则是：首先应适用当事人约定的准据法，如当事人未约定准据法，则应适用仲裁地的法律。本案中，对于认定本案所涉仲裁协议效力的法律适用，本案当事人确定的准据法均是中华人民共和国法律，故本案应适用中华人民共和国法律。
合议庭同时认为：74/9805LD02号提单背面条款第2条是一个管辖权条款。一项争议的解决如果约定了提交仲裁，那么它本身应排斥诉讼，仲裁与诉讼不能同时进行，否则就违背了仲裁制度的根本原则。在本案所涉管辖权条款中，当事人既约定了进行仲裁又约定了进行诉讼，该仲裁协议应认定无效。至于华兴海运(中国)托运有限公司请求法院裁定该提单中的法律适用和司法管辖条款有效问题，由于铁行渣华有限公司、铁行渣华(香港)有限公司并没有要求本院对此进行确认，不属本案审理的范围，应另行处理。
2．何谓国际商事仲裁？国际商事仲裁有哪些特点？
3．何谓国际商事仲裁协议？如何确定一项国际商事仲裁协议的有效性？ 4．试述国际商事仲裁协议的效力。 5．何谓仲裁条款自治理论。
6．何谓非当地化理论？非当地化理论有哪些进步意义？
7．如何确定国际商事仲裁中实体问题和程序问题的法律适用？ 8．试述我国的国际商事仲裁裁决异议制度及其完善。
9．试述我国的国际商事仲裁裁决承认与执行制度及其完善。
【扩展性阅读材料】 1.郭玉军、肖芳：《网上仲裁的现状与未来》，《法学评论》2003年第2期。 2.宋连斌、黄进：《〈中华人民共和国仲裁法〉（建议修改稿）》，《法学评论》2003年第4期。 3.邓杰：《英国关于仲裁协议书面形式的立法发展及其对海事仲裁的影响》，《法制与社会发展》2001年第5期。 4.邓杰：《论仲裁庭管辖权自决原则》，《中国国际私法与比较法年刊》第5卷,法律出版社2002年版。 5.李双元、谢石松：《国际民事诉讼法概论》，武汉大学出版社2001年第2版，第491－584页。 6. 韩健：《现代国际商事仲裁法的理论与实践》，法律出版社2000年版。
7.宋连斌：《国际商事仲裁管辖权研究》，法律出版社2000年版。 8．刘晓红：《国际商事仲裁协议的法理与实证》，商务印书馆2005年版。 9.赵健：《国际商事仲裁的司法监督》，法律出版社2000年版。 10．邓杰：《商事仲裁法理论与实务》，兰州大学出版社2005年版。 11．高菲：《中国海事仲裁的理论与实践》，中国人民大学出版社1998年版。
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12.About International Arbitration A. Description of Arbitration:
With the rapid growth and expansion of the world financial and business communities, it is increasingly important for businesses to have an established method of resolving business disputes quickly, efficiently and constructively.
When disputes arise in the course of business, parties often prefer to settle them privately and informally, in a businesslike fashion that will enable them to maintain their business relationship.
Arbitration is designed for just such occasions, in that it can be designed for quick, practical and efficient resolution.
Arbitration is a voluntary process of dispute resolution where a neutral third party renders a final and binding decision after each side has an opportunity to present its view. This method is especially useful in international business transactions where parties are often unfamiliar with foreign legal systems.
Unlike a judicial process, arbitration is conducted outside the court system by impartial arbitrators who are selected by the parties based on criteria that best fits the nature of the contract. Arbitration is usually conducted by either one arbitrator or a panel of three arbitrators with the structure, format, site and scope of arbitration all decided by the parties and memorialized in the arbitration clause of their contract. The parties usually negotiate the arbitration clause at the same time they develop the initial contract. A properly structured provision will help establish a framework for expeditious resolution of contract disputes.
Arbitration allows the parties greater flexibility than a court proceeding. Parties can decide to have abbreviated time periods in which to respond to claims, where the arbitration will be conducted, how formal the process will be, or whether to involve lawyers in the arbitration.
B. Advantages of Arbitration over Litigation:
1. Impartiality of Decision Maker -- Where a party is concerned that a court in another country may not be neutral, arbitration allows parties chose the arbitrators who will decide the matter;
2. Enforceability of Arbitral Awards -- Arbitration awards are final and can be challenged only under very limited circumstances;
3. Confidentiality -- Where arbitration proceedings and awards are normally private, court proceedings and judgments are frequently public; 4. Expertise -- Parties may choose arbitrators with technical backgrounds who will understand the specific issues in the case;
5. Limited Discovery -- Because the parties may choose to limit discovery in their arbitration, arbitration can be less burdensome; 6. Expense -- Arbitration is usually less expensive than litigation;
7. Brevity -- Arbitration usually produces a resolution more quickly than litigation; and,
8. Relationships -- Arbitration may be viewed as less adversarial, thereby preserving long-term business relationships. C. Kinds of Disputes Subject to Arbitration:
Generally speaking, there is a two-step process to determine if a controversy is arbitrable: 24
http://www.osec.doc.gov/ogc/occic/arb-98.html, visited on March 22.2007.
First, parties should specify in an arbitration agreement or in an arbitration clause of a contract whether disputes will be subject to arbitration; second, the parties should consider that the law of the country in which the arbitration takes place may prohibit arbitration for certain types of disputes. Arbitration for commercial matters, however, is normally encouraged.
The types of disputes that are considered arbitrable varies among countries. In the United States, courts have strongly favored arbitration in the resolution of international business disputes. They have held that almost all civil disputes can be arbitrated and have denied arbitration only where Congress has expressly stated that the provisions of a specific law can be enforced only in the courts.
D. The Agreement to Arbitrate
Arbitration agreements are formed at one of two points in time: during the negotiation of a contract, or after a legal dispute arises. Because the contract negotiation process offers greater opportunity to develop an arbitration format without the acrimony that can develop after a controversy arises, inclusion of an arbitration agreement as a clause in a contract is preferable and can streamline the dispute resolution process. The arbitration agreement is generally incorporated into the contract governing the transaction.
E. Elements of the Arbitration Agreement
The following elements should be considered for inclusion in any arbitration agreement:
1. Scope of Arbitration - The parties should explicitly state the matters that they want the arbitration agreement to cover. However, they should be aware that local law may restrict issues that may be subject to arbitration.
2. Choice of Arbitrator(s)
a. The clause must specify the selection process, otherwise statutes and rules may fill any gaps;
b. If institutional rules are used that provide for selection of arbitrators, no further reference to selection may be necessary;
c. A panel of three arbitrators is standard for international commercial arbitrations, with the parties each appointing one, and the parties or arbitrators selecting a third. In some circumstances an appointing authority will designate any missing members (e.g. where one of the parties refuses to select an arbitrator as a dilatory tactic);
d. A sole arbitrator may be preferable for disputes involving smaller amounts; and,
e. If an arbitrator must have a special skill, it should be specified in the arbitration agreement. 3. Choice of Law
a. The parties should designate the substantive law that will be applied in the arbitration;
b. The parties may select a procedural law. If they do not, the procedural law of the place where the arbitration occurs will apply; and, c. Absent an express choice of applicable law, the law of the place of the arbitration will be applied. 4. Choice of Location
a. A forum country should be selected that is a signatory to an international arbitration convention (i.e., the New York or Panama Conventions);
b. The location determines the extent of potential assistance, or even interference, by national courts during an arbitral proceeding and it may affect enforcement of the award;
c. Practical features such as facilities, communications and transportation systems, freedom of movement of persons, documents and currency, and support services should be considered; and,
d. The choice of location in the arbitration agreement should include the name of both the city and country.
5. Choice of Language - Parties may designate one language as the official language of the proceedings and allow simultaneous interpretation into another
language.
6. Choice of Rules - Parties should specify the rules of procedure that will govern the arbitration process.
If selecting institutional rules to govern the arbitration, parties should consider whether those rules provide for: a. The selection of a site where it is not specified in the arbitration clause; b. Assessment of costs, including allocation between parties; c. Selection of arbitrators;
d. Powers given to the arbitrator;
e. The language in which the proceeding will be conducted; f. The substantive law to be applied; g. The use of experts;
h. The time allowed to arbitrators to make awards;
i. The power of any administering authority over the awards; j. The availability of provisional relief; and,
k. Flexibility to allow parties to opt out of certain provisions.
If the parties do not use institutional rules, the following items should be included in their own ad hoc rules: a. Procedure to initiate arbitration proceedings;
b. Means for dealing with the refusal of a party to proceed with arbitration; c. Scope and limitation of discovery;
d. Outline of hearing procedures, including notice and form of the award (whether it must be written out with reasons for the decision); and, e. Procedures for enforcement of the award.
7. Interim Relief -- Some arbitration rules specifically address matters of interim relief, i.e., whether the parties may apply to a court for a preliminary injunction, an order of attachment or other order preserving the status quo until the arbitrator(s) decide the case. The rules of most arbitration institutions provide that resorting to a court in such circumstances is not incompatible with, or a waiver of, the right to arbitrate under their rules. Moreover, most rules allow the arbitrators to order such relief.
8. Costs -- The arbitration agreement should provide for the allocation of costs.
9. Award of Tribunal -- The agreement should specify that a majority of the arbitrators must agree on an award and that it must be based on applicable law. The agreement should also specify the currency for payment of the award. If the award is to be recognized and enforced internationally, it may need to state reasons and legal basis, including reference to the process by which the legal basis was selected. Some awards contain no reasoning or written report.
第二十三章 国际商事和解与调解
【思考题】
1.下述案件可以通过哪些方式解决？此案的最终处理结果应会怎样？
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【案例23.1】北京保险公司诉埃及“亚历山大”轮案 1992年1月8日，“亚历山大”轮由美国装载纤维棉和地毯编织机械设备30箱，运往上海、天津。2月抵上海卸下部分纤维棉，剩余部分连同地毯编织机械设备于3月15日抵天津新港。根据船方签具的清洁提单，这些货物在美国装船时是完好无损的，但卸货过程中发现地毯编织机械设备有22箱严重残损。3月20日，中国外轮理货公司制作22箱货物残损清单，船方也予以签认。卸货后，收货人北京燕山石油化学总公司请天津进出口商品检验局鉴定。鉴定结果表明，货损原因系由于“亚历山大”轮货舱没有分层隔板，货箱不适当地装载于货垛中层，货箱遭受上层货物的重压所致。初步确定货损约达30万美元。这些地毯编织机械设备的货运保险是由中国人民保险公司北京分公司承保的。北京保险分公司经过调查认为，船方对货损负有不可推卸的责任，应由“亚历山大”轮船东埃及金比轮船公司赔偿货损30万美元。当“亚历山大”轮船8月11日驶抵广州黄埔港时，北京保险分公司便于14日委托广东保险分公司向法院申请扣船，同时也向船东提出索赔和先行提供担保的要求。
在法院准备扣押“亚历山大”轮期间，广东保险分公司通知金比轮船公司，它已向法院提出扣船申请，要求船东立即提供银行担保。船东接电后，立即通过辛德兰保赔协会请加拿大英国皇家银行向伦敦中国银行提供了30万美元的担保，同时提出双方友好协商或者提交中国国际经济贸易仲裁委员会仲裁解决的建议。在索赔获得切实保障的情况下，广东保险分公司即向法院提出撤销扣船申请，法院准其申请，遂未宣布扣船命令。
2.简述国际商事和解的原则和国际商事和解协议的效力。 3.简述国际商事调解的类型和国际商事调解协议的效力。
4.以《联合国国际贸易法委员会国际商事调解示范法》为例，说明国际商事调解的进行。 【扩展性阅读材料】 1．郭玉军、甘勇：《美国选择性争议解决方式研究（ADR）》，《国际法与比较法论丛》第5辑，中国方正出版社2003年版。 2．范愉：《非诉讼程序(ADR)教程》，中国人民大学出版社2002年版。 3. Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR): an Overview26 2526
参见李双元、欧福永主编：《国际私法教学案例》，北京大学出版社2007年版，第427－429页。
http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/index.php/ADR#alternative_dispute_resolution_.28adr.29:_an_overview, visited on March 23, 2007.
Alternative Dispute Resolution (“ADR”) refers to any means of settling disputes outside of the courtroom. ADR typically includes arbitration, mediation, early neutral evaluation, and conciliation. As burgeoning court queues, rising costs of litigation, and time delays continue to plague litigants, more states have begun experimenting with ADR programs. Some of these programs are voluntary; others are mandatory.
The two most common forms of ADR are arbitration and mediation. Arbitration is a simplified version of a trial involving no discovery and simplified rules of evidence. Either both sides agree on one arbitrator, or each side selects one arbitrator and the two arbitrators elect the third to comprise a panel. Arbitration hearings usually last only a few hours and the opinions are not public record. Arbitration has long been used in labor, construction, and securities regulation, but is now gaining popularity in other business disputes.
Title 9 of the U.S. Code establishes Federal law supporting arbitration. It is based on Congress’s plenary power over interstate commerce. Where it applies its terms prevail over state law. There are, however, numerous state laws on ADR. Thirty-five states have adopted the Uniform Arbitration Act as state law. Thus, the arbitration agreement and decision of the arbiter may be enforceable under state and federal law.
In 1970, the United States joined the UN Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.
Mediation is an even less formal alternative to litigation. Mediators are individuals trained in negotiations who bring opposing parties together and attempt to work out a settlement or agreement that both parties accept or reject. Mediation is used for a wide gamut of case-types: ranging from juvenile felonies to Federal government negotiations with Native American Indian tribes. Mediation has also become a significant method for resolving disputes between investors and their stock brokers. See, NASD Arbitration and Mediation.