people make
sensible distinctions between what they prefer and what they regard as fair. The results were the same for
participating students who imagined themselves as being employees and participants who were true employees,
suggesting that no serious threats to external validity are committed when university students are used as participants.
Cent quatre-vingt-dix participants (95 e磘udiants universitaires et 95 employe磗) ont re磒ondu a` une enque坱e factorielle dans laquelle un certain nombre de ta坈hes d抋llocation de nature organisationnelle e磘aient
de碿rites. Les participants devaient s抜maginer eux-me坢es en tant qu抏mploye磗 dans des entreprises fictives et
choisir parmi trois allocations repre磗entant des sche`mes d抜nvestissement employe磗-de磛eloppement effectue磗 par
le directeur dans diffe磖ents groupes de travail. Les allocations tenaient compte de la fac竜n dont les investissements devaient e坱re attribue磗 entre deux partis. Les participants ont choisi deux fois, une premie`re fois en regard de ce
qui leur apparaissait le plus juste et une autre fois en regard de ce qui leur semblait le mieux. Un facteur
intergroupe variait selon que les partis repre磗entaient des comparaisons sociales (c.-a` -d. choisir parmi des
allocations a` distribuer entre deux groupes de travail diffe磖ents) ou temporelles (c.-a` -d. choisir parmi des allocations a` distribuer entre le pre磗ent et l抋nne磂 a` venir). Un autre facteur intergroupe variait selon que
l抏ndogroupe e磘ait repre磗ente?par les partis ou non. Une allocation be磏e磃iciait a` un parti, une autre favorisait
conjointement les deux partis et une troisie`me be磏e磃iciait e磄alement aux deux partis, mais dans une moindre
mesure. Il e磘ait pre磀it que l抏磄alite? quoique toujours de磃iciente pour les deux partis, serait l抋llocation pre磃e磖e磂
quand les partis repre磗entaient des comparaisons sociales et quand les choix e磘aient base磗 sur la justice. Quand les
# 2007 International Union of Psychological Science
http://www.psypress.com/ijp DOI: 10.1080/00207590701545668
Correspondence should be addressed to Daniel Eek, who is now at AstraZeneca R&D Mo?lndal, SE-431 83 Mo?lndal, Sweden (Email:
Daniel.Eek@astrazeneca.com) or to Marcus Selart, Department of Strategy and Management, Norwegian School of Economics
and Business Administration, Breiviksveien 40, N-5045 Bergen, Norway (E-mail: Marcus.Selart@nhh.no).
This research was financially supported by grant 421-2001-4697 to Daniel Eek from the Swedish Research Council and grant F0652/
96 to Marcus Selart from the Swedish Council for Research in the Humanities and Social Sciences. We thank an anonymous reviewer
and the editor for valuable comments on previous versions of the manuscript, Charlotta Love磏 and Lars Berner for assistance in
collecting the data, and Daniel Falkstedt for valuable comments. INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY, 2009, 44 (2), 109?19
partis repre磗entaient des comparaisons temporelles et quand les choix e磘aient base磗 sur la pre磃e磖ence, il e磘ait
attendu que l抋llocation pre磃e磖e磂 serait le be磏e磃ice conjoint. Les re磗ultats ont soutenu ces hypothe`ses.
Contrairement a` ce qui e磘ait attendu, le fait que l抏ndogroupe soit repre磗ente?par les partis ou non n抋 pas mode磖e?
les re磗ultats, indiquant que les pre磃e磖ences d抋llocation des participants n抏磘aient pas affecte磂s par leurs inte磖e坱s
personnels. Le message principal est que les gens font des distinctions sensibles entre ce qu抜ls pre磃e`rent et ce qu抜ls
croient e坱re juste. Les re磗ultats ont e磘e?les me坢es pour les participants e磘udiants qui s抜maginaient en tant
qu抏mploye磗 et les participants qui e磘aient de re磂ls employe磗, sugge磖ant qu抋ucune menace se磖ieuse a` la validite?
externe n抋 e磘e?commise en utilisant des e磘udiants universitaires comme participants. Cientonoventa participantes (95 estudiantes universitarios y 95 empleados) respondieron un cuestionario
factorial en el que se describan una serie de tareas de asignaciones organizacionales basadas en casos. Se
pidio?a los participantes que se imaginaran a ellos mismos como empleados en organizaciones ficticias y que
escogieran entre tres asignaciones de esquemas de desarrollo para trabajadores, las cuales eran utilizadas por el
gerente en diferentes grupos de trabajo. Las asignaciones consideraron co磎o tales inversiones se distribuiran
entre dos partidos. Los participantes tuvieron la posibilidad de escoger dos veces, una, tomando en consideracio磏
la asignacio磏 ma?s justa, y otra, considerando la mejor asignacio磏. Uno de los factores de relacio磏 entre sujetos
variaba si los grupos empleaban comparaciones sociales (p.e., escoger entre asignaciones en relacio磏 a dos
diferentes grupos de trabajo) o temporales (p.e., escoger entre asignaciones correspondientes al an榦 presente o al
venidero). Otro factor de relacio磏 entre sujetos variaba si los participantes en el grupo eran representados por el
partido o no. Mientras que una asignacio磏 maximizo?los resultados de un partido, la otra maximizo?los
resultados conjuntos recibidos por ambas partes y la tercera posicio磏 proporciono?a ambos partidos resultados
iguales pero bajos. Se predijo que, la igualdad, aunque siempre deficiente para ambas partes,
sera la asignacio磏
preferida cuando los partidos utilizaban comparaciones sociales y las elecciones se basaban en lo justo. Cuando
los partidos empleaban comparaciones temporales, y las elecciones se basaron en preferencias, se hipotetizo?que
la maximizacio磏 de los resultados conjuntos sera la asignacio磏 preferida. Los resultados apoyaron estas
hipo?tesis. En contra de lo predicho, si la experiencia intragrupal fue representada o no por los partidos no afecto?
a los resultados, indicando que las preferencias de asignacio磏 de los participantes no fueron afectadas por el propio intere磗. El mensaje ma?s importante de este estudio es que las personas hacen una sensible distincio磏 entre
lo que prefieren y lo que consideran justo. Los resultados fueron los mismos en estudiantes que participaron en el
estudio y se imaginaron a s mismos como siendo empleados y participantes que eran realmente empleados,
sugiriendo que no hay amenazas serias para la validez externa cuando estudiantes universitarios son utilizados
como participantes.
When people in groups allocate resources between members of their group, they most often consider equal allocations to be fairest and, therefore, choose to give equal shares to all group members when possible (e.g., Allison & Messick, 1990). This is especially true when inputs from group members do not differ. In such circumstances, equality coincides with equity, suggesting that a resource should be allocated proportionally to inputs
(Adams, 1965). However, people often still choose to allocate resources equally even when inputs differ (e.g., Messick & Schell, 1992) and when
alternative allocations would be more beneficial to all (Eek & Ga?rling, 2006; Selart & Eek, 2005). Thus, it is fair to say that splitting resources equally is an often-used method of allocation and that equality sometimes qualifies as some form of heuristic or shallow process (for a review, see Selart & Eek, 1999).
In this article we present an experimental study demonstrating that choices of allocation principle depend to a large extent on the dimension that is used as the criterion for the evaluation. As an
example, fair principles for allocation differ quite dramatically from preferred allocation principles. Furthermore, equality is often preferred even
though utility is not maximized as prescribed by decision theory (e.g., Von Neuman &
Morgenstern, 1947). Hence, the main purpose of
our study is to make as transparent as possible the environmental circumstances under which equality dominates as a principle. It is argued that
contextual dimensions, such as type of comparison (social/temporal), in-group representation (ingroup/ out-group), and response mode (fairest/
most preferred option), explain whether or not equality dominates. The perspective taken is that social decision behaviour is context dependent and that preference is constructed in the decision situation (Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1993;
Selart, 1996; Selart & Eek, 1999). We argue that equality in certain contexts may be chosen as a
result of fairness perceptions and not necessarily as a result of simplicity. We also argue that contextual factors are able to evoke reasons that
provoke individuals to reason based more on 110 EEK AND SELART
maximization or self-interest, thus establishing preference structures that depart from equality. Equality and other allocation principles
Equality prescribes equal shares to all recipients and an abundance of previous research has been devoted to providing answers to why this principle is endorsed so often (for reviews see, e.g., Messick, 1993, 1995). Several interesting and important conclusions can be inferred. For instance, in line with what was first theorized by Deutsch (1975), equality is the dominating allocation principle when people have social concern as the goal of their interaction (e.g., Kazemi, Eek, & Ga?rling, 2005a, b; Selart & Eek, 2005). One reason is that equality stresses the cooperative aspects of a relationship between status-equals. In contrast, the equity principle (e.g., Adams, 1965) stresses competitive aspects among members of a collective (e.g., Sampson, 1975). Diekman, Samuels, Ross, and Bazerman (1997) argued that it may be the particular value of signalling equal status among people that often turns equality into the most preferred allocation principle.
Equality is also an appealing solution, since deviations from equality often seem to produce